Roger Cohen doesn't claim this scenario comes from Mohamed El Baradei, but there is that implication since the context is a description of a long interview.Here's the scenario he or they come up with:
Iran ceases military support for Hamas and Hezbollah; adopts a “Malaysian” approach to Israel (non-recognition and non-interference); agrees to work for stability in Iraq and Afghanistan; accepts intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency verification of a limited nuclear program for peaceful ends only; promises to fight Al Qaeda terrorism; and commits to improving its human rights record.
The United States commits itself to the Islamic Republic’s security and endorses its pivotal regional role; accepts Iran’s right to operate a limited enrichment facility with several hundred centrifuges for research purposes; agrees to Iran acquiring a new nuclear power reactor from the French; promises to back the country’s entry into the World Trade Organization; returns seized Iranian assets; lifts all sanctions; and notes past Iranian statements that it will endorse a two-state solution acceptable to the Palestinians.
I don't know if Iran would accept a deal like this if it was offered. The entire issue from both sides hinges on what a "Malaysian" approach to Israel entails in detail. The US plan for Palestine is to starve the Palestinians unless and until they vote in a way that arguably can be interpreted as acceptance of a two state solution, or arguably can be interpreted as acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state.
The Shah would have stood back and watched that process. The Egyptians have accepted a role in advancing this process, contrary to the sensibilities of the Egyptian people - the price of this being US acceptance and support for a permanent family-led dictatorship Mubarak and his progeny. Malaysia is much farther away from Israel than Iran is, but if Malaysia was geographically in Iran's position it would be acting a lot more like Iran does now than like Saudi Arabia.
Standing back and watching the US and Israel further pressure the Palestinians would be a difficult arrangement for Iran to accept exactly because it is contrary to the Iranian idea of justice. Unless the deal includes some provision for changing what seems to be the US plan of having the Palestinians approve a two state solution under duress. The plan would have to include a provision for what happens if the Palestinians do not vote for a two state solution.
In other words, this deal requires an actual agreement between Iran and the US on the ultimate resolution of the Israel dispute.
From the US/Israeli point of view, once sanctions break, they are difficult to reinstate. Once US companies have contracts with Iran, profits are being made and offices opened, the US has few options if covert, then increasingly open, aid begins flowing again from Iran to the Palestinians. The Saudis and Egyptians, if they do not trade on terms better than Iran's with the West, will feel pressure to at least match Iran in supporting the Palestinians.
A deal like this, before an agreement on the outcome of the Israel conflict, would be a huge strategic defeat for Israel and would render Israel's remaining a Jewish state non-viable over the long term.
It is good to see scenarios at least fleshed out specifically. Statements about "grand bargains" without details hide the real difficulties that may actually be impassable. In that sense Cohen has performed a service.
Roger Cohen of the New York Times seems to have taken the lead role in selling a rapprochement between the US and Iran to the US decision-making community. This new role, if memory serves, began after the beginning of the Obama administration. It is possible that this is an indicator that there is a serious intention of recasting the US/Iranian relationship. Friends of Israel are right to feel threatened by such a recasting. Friends of the Palestinians watch this with cautious optimism. We'll see where it goes.
