Sunday, February 03, 2008

Myth: Most Palestinians Accept the Legitimacy of Israel

Westerners, across the political spectrum, often demonstrate an inability to mentally process challenges to the idea that Israel is legitimately a Jewish state that I find somewhat puzzling. By this I don't mean that they disagree with challenges to Israel's legitimacy. I mean further that they seem to create in their own minds a world where there is essentially no disagreement over whether or not there should be a Jewish state between Jordan and Egypt.

When a Westerner encounters the opinion that there should not be a Jewish state, that Westerner, whether liberal or conservative, interprets the opinion as an opinion that Jews should be murdered or some other bizarre fantasy that is entirely unrelated to the original opinion.

I'm completely certain that Westerners reading this blog have reached the conclusion that I hate Jews and want them killed to create a Jew-free Middle East. I don't hold anything like those opinions but Westerners interpret challenges to Israel's legitimacy that way, and there is nothing I could write that would change that.

It is part of reality that in the minds of many Westerners, a non-hateful, non-genocidal belief that Israel should not be a Jewish state does not, and cannot exist.

This inability to perceive, to mentally process, the fact that others believe Israel should not be a Jewish state colors the creation and interpretation of polls I see from time to time of Palestinian opinion with respect to Israel. Here is a typical example:

63% support and 35% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict.

The support shown here is the result of a contrived effort to inflate reported acceptance of a Jewish state. The additions "the establishment of a Palestinian state" and after "the resolution of all issues of conflict" make respondents more likely to give the right answer, but makes their answers less meaningful.

Whenever the question is asked clearly, "should there be a Jewish state" or "is Israel as a Jewish state legitimate" in nearly any Muslim population or any Middle Eastern population outside of Israel there is consensus approaching unanimity that Israel is not legitimate.

From the same study:

43% support and 54% oppose a permanent settlement in which the refugee problem is resolved based on UN resolution 194 but with restrictions on refugee return to Israel which would be subject to an Israeli decision.

This is a step that is skipped by the headline finding that 63% of Palestinians accept Israel. 43% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement where Israel can limit the return of refugees. But even that is overstated because this in many cases does not reflect a belief that Israel morally has some right to deny refugees. Instead it in those cases reflects a belief that though Israel is immoral, fighting is not worth it.

The view that Israel's Jewish identity is immoral and illegitimate but cannot be successfully challenged under the current circumstances is also a prevalent view of US/Israeli "allies" in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This view is dependent on current circumstances though and can change rapidly with them. That view is ignored, probably non-voluntarily, by most Western observers of the Middle East.

  • Most people in throughout the Middle East do not hate Jews, do not advocate genocide and do not accept Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state.
  • There are reasonable people who do not accept Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state.

The above are two sentences that are true and that I believe many, even most Western supporters of Israel, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, whether liberal or conservative, are just not able to process.

If Iran Were America

Linking to a really good essay.

Here is an excerpt:

1980–1988: The America-Mexico War

The Iranians have previously maneuvered one of their long-time Mexican intelligence assets, whom we'll call "José Husseino," into the position of dictator of Mexico. Now they provide their pet dictator with arms, aid and intelligence, and launch Mexico into an invasion of the United States.

Ideally, this policy will topple the revolutionary Christianist government in Washington. Failing that, the Iranian leadership hopes Mexico will seize the oil-rich province of Texas, denying revenue to the new Washington government, while keeping Texas oil within the Iranian "sphere of influence."

The Canada/Israel analogy misses some important elements, but that is my only criticism of the essay. The essay itself is astonishingly well written for something by a Westerner.

Saturday, February 02, 2008

Bribes For Iraq's Parliament

A computer-generated translation of an article in the Akhbar Alkhaleej newspaper.

An Iraqi MP preferred to remain anonymous told the newspaper that highly confidential negotiations took place by representatives from American oil companies, offering $5 million to each MP who votes in favor of the Oil and Gas law.

I've always assumed that direct corruption is an important element of US leverage over Iraq's government. And I've read reports that Iraq under the occupation has become the most corrupt place in the Middle East.

I've never read a report of a direct accusation of a specific instance of corruption until now.

My first thought on reading this is to congratulate the Iraqi parliament for so far resisting what I'm sure are huge pressures from the US to succomb to this type of corruption.

My second thought is that I guess it's mathematically possible that this report is fabricated from nothing, I find that completely implausible. I see no reason that the US would not engineer the writing of an oil law substantially more favorable to the US than the standard oil laws of the region and attempt to use corruption to split the difference between US companies and whichever Iraqi leaders are willing to be paid off.

My third thought though, is that I am very disappointed by the failure of the Western press to uncover and present this story earlier.

When Iraq's parliament, at the urging of the Sadr faction, prepared to nominate Jaafari for another term as Prime Minister, Bush said that was not acceptable. Rice flew into Iraq for consultations on stopping his candidacy. As adamant as the US or England could be, the fact was they had no votes on Parliament. My questions at the time were "What leverage does Rice have?" "What can Rice be saying that could be persuasive to members of Iraq's parliament?"

The common answer at the time was since the US has around 150,000 troops in the country it has to have some leverage. While as a generality that may qualify as a true statement, the specific story of what Rice could and did promise to change the votes of Iraq's parliamentarians had to be an interesting and important story.

It was very frustrating at the time to watch the Western press fail to even address that question. I concluded that the reason for that failure was partly that the Western press was sympathetic to the aims of the Bush administration, more widely than they pretended and partly that many members of the press are not able to immediately see the disconnect between the influence the US had in theory and the influence the US was acting as if it had. If members of the press had perceived that gap, they would have worked to explain it, instead the gap never entered their field of vision.

We're getting the first concrete indications that US influence in Iraq's parliament is powered at least partly by direct monetary payments. It is true that every skeptical observer, including myself, has believed this to be the case for years now. But belief via ruling out of alternatives is different from having specific examples. A press that was doing its job would have provided specific examples a long time ago.

Along with Iraq's legistlature, congratulations are also in order for the Akbhar Al-Khaleej Newspaper that has done in Arabic what no Western press source has done in English to my knowledge.

Sunday, January 27, 2008


Reading "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony", a New York Times essay whose message is pretty well contained in the title, I came across author Parag Khanna's predictions of the world in 2016.

It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.

I'd say these are more wrong than right. I'd say as a rhetorical point that predictions should never be used to advance an argument. I expect to see a decline in US power pretty much from now on, but that's probably hopeful thinking as much as anything. US power increased from 1980 to 1990. I'm not sure there is anything fundamental I can say about 2008 that I could not say about 1980.

So about the US overall standing in the world eight years from now. The US has less standing than it had last year at this time. Maybe that trend will continue, maybe it will not.

I really do not expect to see an independent Kurdistan. If there is an independent Kurdistan then I expect Turkey to take a major symbolic step against US interests. Something like closing a US base in Turkey, or joining a free-trade agreement with Iran or leasing a naval base to Russia. Something dramatic.

It is easy to predict that there will not be a pro-US government in Iraq eight years from now. I find it harder to predict how many US troops will be in ideologically hostile Iraq. The easiest guess is more than 100,000 troops. The United States invaded so that it could have leverage over the Iraqi government, and it needs a substantial amount of troops to do that.

The bases in the Persian gulf remaining is a pretty easy guess.

Afganistan being stable is unlikely. The Taliban being either routed or disbanded and territory where Taliban is currently influential being under the sway of Kabul is close to inconceivable. The US is more likely to pull out of Afganistan and leave it under a ruling arrangment negotiated between local groups, Russia, Iran and Pakistan. The most likely situation is that Afghanistan in 2016 looks a lot like Afghanistan in 2008. A lot of territory is contested. Not a lot of open warfare.

Iran being nuclear as in having a weapon is very unlikely. Iran being "nuclear capable" is a very easy guess, since Iran is "nuclear capable" today. It is easy to predict that Iran will receive more investment in its energy sector than it does today. US sanctions of some sort will continue to have some modest impact.

China absorbing Taiwan is very unlikely. China will steadily increase its commercial ties with Taiwan. Public opinion in Taiwan may be more favorable towards unification in 2016 than it is today. That is not a safe prediction though.

China's navy will be stronger than it is today. It will not be strong enough to capture Taiwan. The global naval balance will feel in 2016 a lot like it feels in 2008. The US will remain by far the most powerful naval force.

The EU may expand. EU access to gas will probably be secure, but access to gas is for the most part secure now. I guess that's a safe prediction. I'm not sure what unsecure access to gas would mean in the context of the EU.

In the Middle East, it seems that a consensus is forming that the US is not and should not be the only game in town. Saudi Arabia and now Egypt seem to be pulling out of the US orbit. I expect this to continue, but sliding out of an orbit is a gradual process and it is hard to predict what landmarks will have been passed in eight years if any. Egypt in particular will have a new leader in 2016. The safest prediction is that it will unfortunately be Mubarak's son.

2016 is a long way off though. I'm more interested in what 2009 will look like.

The United States is going to expend a lot of resources this year keeping both Olmert and Abbas in power. Once one is gone though, it can let go of the other. I'm confident that in two years, both Israel and Palestine will be represented by more radical leaderships. One year is harder to predict. I'm leaning towards either more radical elements of Fatah or Hamas being in power in the West Bank and Israel's right wing replacing Olmert by this time next year.

It is easy to predict that the United States will continue its policy of refusing to engage Hamas until Hamas renounces the right to return. And Hamas will not renounce the right of return. Forgetting morality, this is the most impractical possible policy for the US to take and it will take a toll on US relationships with other powers in the region while pointlessly leading to Palestinian and Israeli deaths that otherwise would not have occurred. US Gaza policy bears the mark of an exceptionally untalented administration in the US executive branch.

Next year at this time, Hamas will be in power at least in Gaza. One way or another goods will easily reach Gaza through Egypt. The weaponry and skill of anti-Israel forces in Gaza will increase substantially. It is possible but not quite probable that over this year rockets from Gaza actually are going to become routinely fatal to Israelis. I hope though that in two years, after a year without Bush and Rice, a long term cease-fire is reached that stops the rockets and ends the siege. This siege is comically stupid. It accomplishes nothing. It has to be the stupidest siege in history.

It is easy to predict that the United States will continue to insist that Lebanon's Shiites will not have proportionate power in Lebanon's government and that Lebanon's Shiites will not end the current stalemate as long as US allies in Lebanon reflect this position. This policy will pointlessly lead to Lebanese deaths that otherwise would not have occurred. In the end, the Shiites will have a veto just as smaller population groups do. This must be the stupidest political stalemate in the world today.

Next year at this time there will be a government in place in Lebanon. Hezbollah will not be disarmed and may be in the process of folding into the Lebanese army. Effectively, the Shiites will have veto power and there will be reforms to the electoral system. Nasrallah will describe it as a victory. I'll probably agree. In other words, the stalemate will have been broken in Hezbollah's favor.

I expect a pretty uneventful year in Syria.

Hopefully Kirkuk will not be part of Kurdistan this time next year. I'm optimistic that it will not. Most likely the postponements of the referendum in Kirkuk will be so routine that everybody knows the referendum is never going to happen.

2008 looks to be a good year in terms of not many US soldiers killed in Iraq.

Iran has informed the IAEA that it is testing a new centrifuge design. At this time next year there will be at least some operational. What Iran has now is really enough though, so getting a few hundred of another design running doesn't change the strategic picture at all. Of course neither the US or Israel are going to bomb Iran in 2008.

So we'll see by January 2009 how well these predictions held up.

Saturday, January 26, 2008

Iran: We'll Have Relations with Israel After Zionism

If the Iranians and other Muslim anti-Zionists understood how effective it is rhetorically in the West to associate Zionism with Apartheid, they'd explicitly draw the comparison every single time their position on Israel comes into discussion.

Unfortunately, Zionism is aided, somewhat, in its efforts to keep Western support by Zionism's supporters having a better understanding of which terms carry which emotional leverage in the West than many of Zionism's opponents.

May steps toward closing this gap become a trend:

"Iran is not threatening Israel and does not want nuclear weapons, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Saturday.

... ... ...

The Iranian foreign minister went on to say that Iran did not recognize two countries, South Africa and Israel. "With South Africa, the problem was solved with the end of apartheid and if the situation also changes in the other case [Israel], there is no reason why relations with that country cannot change too," he added.

Thursday, January 24, 2008

What She Said. She Being Helena Cobban.

I had expected 2008 to be a firework-less year in the Middle East. A stalemate has been reached in Lebanon that everyone is more or less comfortable with. An agreement between Abbas and Olmert cannot be reached because of structural reasons on both sides but they both have reasons to continue pretending to go through the motions. An agreement has to have been reached between the US and Iran over Iraq and Iran's nuclear program that both sides are comfortable with through the end of Bush's term.

But now Hamas has broken out of its blockade. This is Hamas' biggest victory yet. Bigger than winning the elections, bigger than getting Saudi support for a unity government and bigger than its removal of Abbas/Dahlan forces from Gaza. This is a huge victory that destroys the US/Israel/PA narrative that Hamas is stubbornly bringing destitution to Gaza and Palestinians should be realistic to accept US/Israeli terms for cooperation.

Helena Cobban's coverage of this has been by far the best I've come across in the blogosphere.

There's a joke from Europe in the early 1900s that a Jew asks another why he reads the anti-semitic newspapers. The reader says, "This is the only place I can go for good news. Look at this, the Jews control this, the Jews dominate that ..."

Israel's Debka File is becoming one of the best places for anti-Zionist news. They were an early source that commented on the obvious breakthrough between Iran and the US, but when they claimed earlier this week that Hamas would use the electricity crisis to take control of the Rafah border crossing I thought they were being overly alarmist. Turns out they were underly alarmist, as Hamas took down not the border crossing, but the entire border.

(Debka File is not perfect. I never believed their assessment that Israel planned and the US authorized an Israeli takeover of enough Gaza territory to establish bases that Israel would then turn over to Abbas. But Debka File gets a pass on that because even if it had been true, recent events would have forced the cancellation of those plans.)

I'm now shocked by the total lack of response from Israel and the US to this game changing development. I can only figure they are paralyzed by the scope of it and what it can mean.

  1. At minimum blockades cannot work any more.
  2. Israel now cannot prevent Hamas from delivering a better quality of life in Gaza than Abbas can deliver in the West Bank.
  3. The hope that the Palestinian people would learn their lesson and never elect Hamas again has been dashed.
  4. Hamas now has access to all the concrete it wants to build Hezbollah-style fortifications in Gaza - meaning an Israeli ground assault is moving off of the table.
  5. Hamas can upgrade its rocket weaponry nearly without limit now.

Debka File reports these developments as, according to its Israeli military sources, "irreversible". This is a serious short, medium and long term setback for Zionism in that case.