Everyone Is Saying Suleiman Is In

It sounds plausible to me.

"In order to permit further consultations toward reaching a consensus on the election of a new president, the speaker decided to postpone the session scheduled for tomorrow until Friday December 7 at 1:00 p.m.," said a statement issued by Berri's office late Thursday.

Observers said that the sixth postponement was different from the previous ones, since the identity of the next president is apparently no longer subject to debate, with the focus now shifting to finding the most suitable constitutional scenario for having Suleiman elected.

Suleiman will not try to disarm Hezbollah, will not enter a strategic partnership with the United States and will not interfere with the next parliamentary elections. Lebanon is still in a stalemate until the next elections, but Suleiman's election does not change the situation to either side's advantage.

Olmert Says Two State Solution is Alternative to Losing Apartheid Battle

Olmert is continuing his running series of "let me say something stupider." His first entry: "Israel is glad the US is occupying Iraq and bringing stability" was hard to beat. His second entry: "Iran can't be allowed to become a nuclear power like Israel" was also a classic.

His newest entry: "If the Palestinians do not accept a two state solution, they will win a struggle like that against South Africa"

"If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights (also for the Palestinians in the territories), then, as soon as that happens, the State of Israel is finished," Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told Haaretz Wednesday, the day the Annapolis conference ended in an agreement to try to reach a Mideast peace settlement by the end of 2008.

I think the series must be over. There is nothing stupider a sitting Israeli prime minister can say than this.

All three statements were true. The problem is that all three statements are things that critics of Zionism should say, that supporters of Zionism should be able to challenge their opponents to prove without an admission from Israel's elected Prime Minister.

This is nothing like the thousand plus Lebanese civilians and hundreds of Israeli soldiers who died for no Israeli strategic advantage, or the hundreds killed or maimed by cluster bombs Israel rained on Lebanon to Israel's strategic disadvantage (every explosion makes Hezbollah more powerful in Lebanon). But these statements are bad enough that anyone thinking of a career in politics should know to avoid these mistakes.

Olmert is a very bad Israeli prime minister. I can't explain how a person with his lack of talent came to power because he is not a relative of a previous prime minister. Sometimes even countries with competitive political systems get bad leaders.

Refugees Later: Why There Can Be No Peace Agreement

If there was a possible agreement that would satisfy Israel that its status as a Jewish state would not be threatened and would also satisfy most Palestinians, that agreement would have been presented and accepted by now.

There is no such agreement so the US strategy, which has been in place since the foundation of Israel, is to wait for the Palestinians to change their minds about the refugees. Of course this will not happen in 2008 anymore than it did in 1998, 1988 or earlier. Until it happens, there will be no agreement acceptable to both the Palestinians and the Israelis. The US and the rest of the West have been pursuing a hopeless strategy since Israel's inception.

The story of where this strategy comes from is a mixture of weird and interesting. Western supporters of Israel believe the Palestinians changing their minds is the right thing to do. This belief is followed by the belief that since they feel very strongly that its the right thing to do, somehow it will be done. The idea that the Palestinians have a right not to change their minds and actually may not change their minds is just not something Western supporters of Israel are able to put their heads around.

So the Western plans go something like, "we'll give Abbas a lot of guns and he'll shoot every Palestinian who thinks the refugees should return" or "remember those shiny reformed madrassas we're paying Musharaf to build, where we write the curriculum? Let's have Abbas build some in Palestine".

The people shot by Abbas who disagree, the people starved to death to coerce the Palestinians to vote for Abbas? It was the right thing to do, and if the Palestinians have not yet given up on the right to return, it hasn't been done enough. Whenever groups of humans are being evil, as the West is being here, they are using similar reasoning, this concept of "it may seem evil but it is for the greater good" forms the basis of every atrocity in human history. In fact, it probably is the only way any group of human beings anywhere is capable of being evil.

This is not a fringe Western belief. It is a tiny fringe in the West that disagrees with this belief. There is no more complex an explanation for this fact than that Westerners identify, racially or tribally with Jews (whom they perceive as European) than with Palestinians (whom they perceive as racially and religiously more different).

I Guess I'm the Gullible One

At the same time the Saudis and Arabs were stupidly assuming that the United States would both publicly present a specific proposal to settle the refugee and other issues ...

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said that in inviting his country to the Annapolis conference Washington promised to "use its full influence" to ultimately bring about a peace agreement. He said that meant if the two sides could not agree, "we assume the United States will come up with its own ideas."

and also assuming that the United States would hold Israel to a one year deadline ...

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said ahead of his participation in a Middle East peace summit on Tuesday that the United States had promised that negotiations would be concluded within a year.

even though the United States has never said it would do either,

Here I am believing that Maliki had agreed to a long term presence of 50,000 US troops and a favored investment status for US companies, just because I read that in AP ...

Two senior Iraqi officials familiar with the issue say Iraq's government will embrace a long-term U.S. troop presence in return for U.S. security guarantees as part of a strategic partnership. The two officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the subject is sensitive, said U.S. military and diplomatic representatives appeared generally favorable, subject to negotiations on the details, which include preferential treatment for American investments

AFP ...

US President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki vowed Monday to agree next year on the terms for what could be an open-ended US military presence in the war-torn country.

Guardian ...

Iraq's government is preparing to grant the US a long-term troop presence in the country and preferential treatment for American investors in return for a guarantee on long-term security, it emerged today.

Iraqi officials said that, under the proposed formula, Iraq would get full responsibility for internal security and American troops would relocate to bases outside cities. The proposals foresee a long-term presence of about 50,000 US troops, down from the current figure of more than 160,000.

And many other news sources that have since updated their stories.

Well, the White House released the text of the agreement. Most likely not because of the spirit of openness that permeates the administration, but because they were instructed to by the Iraqis. No 50,000 troops. No long term or permanent bases. No favored investment status. Only vague statements that the US would help Iraq's defense and investment environment.

Instead there are two specific commitments, both made by the US in favor of Iraq. The 2008 UN mandate extension will be the last and Iraq will be released from Chapter VII sanctions and restored to full sovereignty as before the invasion of Kuwait.

The world rarely witnesses the lopsided matchups of political talent that we see today. The US sits at the table across from the Arabs and makes coy statements that carry clear implications, then says "let's not actually put that into the agreement."

The Arabs feel they've accomplished a diplomatic victory, though that victory would have had little to no practical meaning anyway. Then months later the Arabs learn that the coy statements didn't mean what they thought they meant. Now the Arabs are really angry. It's going to take some more coy statements to calm them down now.

At the same time in another mismatch, Iraq's government sits across the table from the US making different coy statements. "But let's leave that out of the agreement." "You know, domestic pressures. We're really on your side though."

Not only the administration, but every news source, and even the gullible blogger at MideastReality.blogspot.com believes this story. That in a stroke the US has secured long term bases and Iraq has agreed to be South Korea.

Oh well. Now I know better. The only change the agreement has made is that there is now no chance that there will be a UN mandate in 2009. What will be in its place? Whatever agreement can get past Sadr, the Sunnis, SIIC and the Iraqi Parliament. I doubt it will be Iraq as South Korea.

Saudis Think the US Will Offer Specific Proposals

The Arab world, which is by far the most politically backward region on earth, has leaders that are far more gullible than bright children.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said that in inviting his country to the Annapolis conference Washington promised to "use its full influence" to ultimately bring about a peace agreement. He said that meant if the two sides could not agree, "we assume the United States will come up with its own ideas."

You assume wrong.

An actual specific proposal, especially regarding the refugees but also regarding, for example, water, would be a propaganda setback for the US, because anything Israel or the US could propose would be easy to paint as unreasonable. It would have no impact on the ground though.

Coaxing the US and/or Israel to produce a specific attackable proposal was the entire point of the Saudi/Arab League proposal. It always has been a stupid plan, it was never going to give the results the Saudis hope for. But this is the type of plan monarchies consistently come up with

Declaration of Principles for Long Term Occupation

A setback for both Iraqi nationalists and the anti-US/anti-Zionism parties in the region. How serious a setback depends on the details of the non-binding agreement so far, which are for now secret, and the political situation in Iraq during negotiations.

The Associated Press reported from Baghdad that the proposal would give America preferential treatment for investments in Iraq - a potential bonanza for oil companies - in return for long-term security guarantees, including defence against internal coups.

I have not seen the Iraqi response. Presumably the result of the ultimate negotiations legally would have to pass in Iraq's parliament. That is a legality that the United States will try as hard as possible to ignore.

More information will become available in the coming days, such as the reaction of the Sadrists and the Sunnis which I expect to be angry.

Nawaz Sharif Back: Setback for US/Bhutto

First, does anyone believe Musharraf went to Saudi Arabia last week to ask the Saudis not to release Sharif? And that the Saudis pressured Musharraf to release him?

Under pressure from Saudi Arabia, where Sharif had been living in exile, Musharraf agreed to allow his archrival to come back to Pakistan.

Nobody believes that? Good. Though it might be pleasurable to point out all the different ways that this is a stupid story, what would be the point? On the other hand, why would they even make up a story like that? I bet the Saudis came up with it. Musharraf and Sharif's people must have looked at the Saudis, looked at each other, rolled their eyes and both said "OK" at the same time.

Sharif is back as the final nail in the coffin of the Musharraf/Bhutto alliance. There is one thing certain about Pakistan politics at this point. Bhutto no longer a factor in it.

Sharif says he didn't meet Musharraf when Musharraf was in Saudi Arabia. I believe him only because he didn't have to meet him. There had to have been contact between intermediaries and there have to be conditions.

A likely condition is that Sharif will not call for general opposition to Musharraf remaining president or to the removal of the legitimate supreme court. The acceptance of Musharraf in the presidency is very disappointing. Mostly because if Musharraf didn't give up power this time, he won't next time.

Pakistan would be a lot better off if Sharif had stayed in Saudi Arabia, denounced any conditions of return and called for those loyal to him to select a successor in Pakistan who would represent the party. The single most important factor in effective political systems is a competitive contest for succession. The second most important is predictable term limits. Both Musharraf and Sharif have shown they are unwilling to put these in place.

Very few people would be willing to establish either a succession contest or term limits once in power. But if the people around them understood the importance to the country of these features of government, they would apply enough pressure, from enough directions, that those in power would accept them.

But the US' candidate and the US are now on the sidelines of Pakistani politics. The US still has some leverage in the form of these billions of dollars its throwing around to the Army. Like the money the US has been throwing at Iraqi politicians, in the long term, this money is just wasted.

The chance that Pakistan ever gets a leader that would either send Pakistani troops or support the sending of US troops to fight Islamists on the frontier because those Islamists host extremists, meaning opponents of Zionism who condone violence, are very slim at this point.

Unfortunately the chance that Pakistan gets a stable, effective political system are also slim at this point.

Good Press Article on Iran: Just Two Missing Points

Ok. Maybe a little more than two, but this from AP reporter Sally Buzbee is overall as good as an article covering Iran by an Western news agency is going to get. "Iran: No Smoking Gun but Strong Evidence":

Many other countries agree that Iran's steps so far — especially its enrichment of uranium and its continued secrecy — suggest it seeks the capability to build a weapon. Those more friendly toward compromise, including Russia and China, urge Iran to be more open.

"There's no consensus that Iran's leadership has decided to build a nuclear arsenal," said David Albright, a former U.N. nuclear inspector now at Washington's Institute for Science and International Security. "There's more of a consensus that they've built a set of capabilities" that could be used for a weapon.

The two points that are missing is that a lot of countries have a set of capabilities that could be used for a weapon and that it is legal for NPT signatories, as well as non-signatories and all nations, to have technologies that may give capabilities that could be used for a weapon.

These are two important points because the entire dispute over Iran's weapons program is not a dispute over claims that Iran is building a weapon, it is a dispute over whether the US will successfully deny Iran capabilities that maybe dozens of other countries have.

Capability is the crux of the dispute, and I'm not sure how well Western reporters understand that. I've seen fewer than a half dozen articles that have made that point, but as the main point of contention, more important than enrichment in itself, this should be mentioned if not explained in every article.

Other than that though, this article is moderately well balanced. There are other nitpicks, and the article's headline is more provocative than the article itself, but definitely not bad. Eventually maybe the majority of articles about Iran will present facts and expert opinions as this does.

Would Iran Suspend Enrichment?

First, obviously somebody somewhere in Iran has hacked into the account of prominent young liberal blogger Matthew Yglesias:

And, indeed, it's not clear that a policy of appeasement would be wise. True, we've seen rational leadership even from vicious dictators like Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong, but the contemporary United States is led by religious fanatics, which introduces a new element into the equation. What's more, the USA is the only country on earth to have ever actually deployed nuclear weapons. Indeed, current political elites are so war-crazed and bloodthirsty that they not only engineered the 2003 attack on Iraq -- a country that tried to appease the Americans by eliminating its nuclear program and allowing IAEA inspectors to certify that it had done so -- but they continue to deny regretting it to this day. And that includes not only radicals like George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, but so-called "moderates" like Hillary Clinton as well.

I guess there comes a point where the truth is the truth. I wouldn't have written that post any better. But Yglesias also points to a McClatchy article entitled "Iran hints it could halt nuclear enrichment for a quid pro quo":

Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency said Friday that his country could suspend uranium enrichment if the United States and Western Europe agreed to acknowledge that its nuclear program was peaceful.

But Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh said there was a "serious confidence gap" between his country and the United States and Western Europe and that he saw little point in trying to "build confidence" with an American administration that had none in his country.

"We don't trust the United States," he told McClatchy Newspapers after the IAEA Board of Governors finished its latest round of talks on Iran's nuclear program. "We could suspend nuclear enrichment. We did it before for two and half years. But it wasn't enough then, and wouldn't be enough now. We will not suspend enrichment again because there is no end to what the United States will demand."

I don't think Soltanieh was clear about what Iran would expect for a suspension and the McClatchy reporters may have heard something that was not quite what was said.

The quid pro quo Iran would expect is more than that the US acknowledges that Iran's program is peaceful. The US is willing to acknowledge a program that does not enrich uranium and does not have other technologies that can produce fuel for weapons is peaceful, as the US says consistently.

Iran would expect, not this year or maybe even next, but at a committed time or after objective milestones comparable to those of other countries have been reached, to be in the position of Brazil, Argentina, Romania, Taiwan, South Korea, Canada, Japan and the Netherlands - which is that Iran would have technologies that could in theory be used to produce weapons.

In this scenario Iran would not be using the technologies to make weapons even though in theory it could. Having technologies even if not using them would offer strategic advantages to Iran that the US wants to deny Iran as long as its primary dispute with Iran and the people of the Middle East continues - the dispute over the legitimacy of Zionism.

So while McClatchy's headline is that Iran offers a halt, the truth is that Iran said that it would be willing to enact a limited suspension with a set time or at least set objective conditions for resumption. The word "suspension" suffers because for a long time the US side of the dispute has been using "suspension" as a code word for an indefinite cessation of enrichment, to be resumed only if a US veto is lifted. The US version of "suspension" is closer to a "halt". A "suspension" in that sense is just as unacceptable to Iran as ever but the definition-creep that occurs on a lot of terms in this dispute may have distorted the perception of McClatchy's reporters and editors.

Not only is the Iranian position not new, but it would be common knowledge and commonly understood if there was public two-way communication between the foreign policy establishments of Iran and the US.

The Hysterical Case Against Iran's Nuclear Program

Sometimes US and European news sources make their most reasonable case against Iran's nuclear program.

Other times we get the more hysterical version of it. This time from Elizabeth Palmer:

The International Atomic Energy Agency has assumed a difficult dual role: global nuclear policeman -- and honest broker. In his latest report to the IAEA Board of Governors this week, the Nobel Prize-winning Head of the Agency Mohammed el Baradei, gave Iran mixed grades for its nuclear transparency.

A “B plus” for coming clean on how and when its nuclear program secretly began, 20 years ago, when Iran was scavenging for restricted knowledge and equipment in, among other places, Pakistan.

But “C” and “D” marks for not allowing IAEA inspectors to investigate the program thoroughly, especially the parts of it that are under military control.

What just happened? I didn't see any grades in the report. Pdf here. Full text here.

But once Palmer gets rolling ...

The U.S. and its allies, on the other hand, see a paranoid, unstable theocracy with an exploding population and Arab enemies on all sides; a country that might decide it needs nuclear weapons precisely in order to “maintain security in the region,” and will not hesitate to make them if it can -- in spite of Jalili’s professed disdain for them.

"The US and its allies." Why can't Israel be mentioned at all in a report about the opposition to Iran's nuclear program? The reason the Shah's program was encouraged by the US but the current regime's program is a global threat is Israel and only Israel. This refusal to name that regime is more than just an irritant. It reaches the root problem of the presentation of the current conflict between the European and Islamic worlds. That problem is reflected by the D-Squared's acclaimed observation that good policies do not need to be covered in a layer of evasion.

The Israeli, US and European fight against everyone who disagrees about the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state is hopelessly unworkable policy and the impulse to hide it shows that while Palmer and others likely have not admitted it to themselves, they become uncomfortable if the discussion veers too close.

Next Iran is paranoid. There has been a steady stream of threats, direct and implied, to attack Iran. From John Bolton, from Dick Cheney, from George Bush, from every direction in Israel. Iran's response to these threats is that they are bluffs. That is closer to the opposite of paranoia than to paranoia.

And then Iran is surrounded by Arab enemies. Can someone send a map to CBS news? But while most of Iran's neighbors are not Arabs and none of Iran's neighbors are enemies, it is true that many Arab countries have their versions of the Shah in power and these Shahs are far more hostile to Iran than any of the people they rule. Similarly, Iran's Shah was far more hostile to Arabs and far less hostile to Israel than the Iranian people ever were.

And of course, as usual, Palmer can't be made to mention the words "Additional Protocol" when describing Iran's reduction in cooperation with the IAEA starting in February 2006. My current theory is that the word "additional" is too provocative. It is veering too close to the idea that Iran's implementation of them was voluntary and non-legally binding. This refusal to explain that situation does not hurt Iran, it only hurts the less informed among Palmer's readers.

Palmer's essay is slightly worse than average for Western press coverage of the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Today I saw the first mention of the words "Additional Protocol" that I've seen in weeks in a Western press article. The press is capable of being fairer. Reporters generally are not working to be as demonizing as possible, they are just looking through the lenses they are wearing, whether they know they're wearing them or not.

No War Yet in Lebanon

Lebanon has been in a political deadlock, pending new elections since the Shiites withdrew from Lebanon's cabinet in December 2006. Now it is starting to seem that this deadlock will continue until the 2009 elections unless elections are called early.

The 2005 elections, held in the aftermath of the death of Hariri, marked the high point for pro-US/pro-Israeli partisans in the country. They'll never do that well again, and they, Hezbollah, Syria, the US and Israel know it. The aim of the West is to get as much done as possible before the next elections. The aim of the anti-Zionists is to forestall any important decisions until after the public has next spoken at the polls, and the bring that time as soon as possible.

It now looks as if the West will not get an executive in place who will try to disarm Hezbollah or who can be counted on the come up with a reason to cancel or "postpone" elections in 2009 so this stalemate will slog on until then.

The West is adamant that its supporters will not give in to demands for new elections or one-person/one-vote reforms of the electoral system and looks as if it will succeed in forestalling those at least until the elections. The West is hoping that the popular mood shifts against Syria and Iran and toward the Israel and the US somehow before 2009. That seems unlikely.

Hezbollah has several big advantages if there was to be another Lebanese civil war. First it is the only armed force that has actually fought a real enemy. Hezbollah's ranks are now staffed by veterans who've been under fire. Second, Hezbollah can be resupplied over land. In a civil war, Hezbollah will attempt, one way or another to take out the airports and ports and is likely to have some success at least rendering them less effective. Third, Hezbollah has control of the most useful territory. It has a long border with Syria and all of the border with Israel. This means not only that Israel cannot intervene over the ground but also that if nobody wins but instead the country splits Hezbollah gets the parts it would want and can fight a battle of attrition for the rest. Fourth the pro-Western Lebanese are rich and soft. They'll up and leave while Hezbollah's supporters will stay. Every day that there are explosions, the balance of forces will tilt a little more toward Hezbollah.

I do not expect a Gaza-type confrontation. Gaza happened because the facts on the ground were being shifted. Dahlan forces were being armed and might reach a point where they could overpower and outlaw Hamas so Hamas struck preemptively.

There is no amount of arms the US can ship into Lebanon that would allow pro-Western forces to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah can afford to wait. If the US crosses a line and installs a president over the Shiite veto, then Hezbollah may ("may" not "will") fight over that. If the president invites foreign troops to disarm Hezbollah, Hezbollah will ("will" not "may") fight over that.

I see the chance of civil war as remote for now. The next Lebanese fireworks are scheduled for 2009. The US needs an executive that will rig, cancel or postpone elections and is not likely to have one by then. If there is not, March 14 loses its majority then and the next parliament will be fine with a one-person one-vote system.

Time May Be On the US Side in Iranian Nuclear Dispute

The US refusal to enter discussions with Iran now does seem to me to be a stalling tactic. Not a good stalling tactic, because it is just as easy to stall during negotiations as without, while negotiations offers at least the possibility of moving towards an agreement. But it is the type of stalling tactic we can expect from the US today.

One interesting development is that Ahmadinejad is relaying what he claims are specific offers made to Iran by the EU.

"They want to get a small concession from us — for instance, that we won't go beyond a certain point within the next four years or we annually make just a certain amount of progress," he said. "This will become a legal precedent. Then, they will come and threaten us to obtain another concession."

If an offer like this was made, it would be interesting to know, according to the proposal, what is to happen after the four years. Four years is enough time for the US to be in a less vulnerable position in Iraq. At which point threats to attack Iran's nuclear program will be more credible.

The US objective today is to impose as stringent sanctions on Iran as possible until it can attack Iran militarily. Iran's objective is to make as much progress as it can until when the US is able to attack, Iran' s program will be more immune. Iran is also using this time to ensure that after the US hostages in Iraq are gone, Iran has alternative deterrents.

While the US is in Iraq, I can't think of a better time for Iran to accomplish the most provocative elements of its nuclear program. If Iran is to make concessions later, it is better to do so with a bigger stock, or with more of a program to partially climb down from.

Additional Protocol. Additional Protocol. Additional Protocol.

Reading current press articles about Iran I read a lot about how Iran has provided less information about its current nuclear program than it did in early 2006.

Elbaradei said that while there was an increased level of cooperation with Iran about its past activities, its knowledge of Iran's current nuclear programmed had "diminished" since 2006.

Also

Muhammad el-Baradei stressed today that the IAEA knows less now about Iran's nuclear activities than it did a year ago.

Also

Inside the meeting, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei told delegates that his agency knows less now about Iran's atomic activities than it did a year ago.

But I'm not reading that Iran stopped implementing the voluntary additional protocols a year ago. Of course this is spelled out in Baradei's report and of course the press knew this before the report. The term "additional protocols" is an important detail in this story that is currently being left out by every news organization that covers it.

Why?

The thing about the Additional Protocols is that they require giving the IAEA information that the US would use to target Iran's nuclear infrastructure if the US was to attack. Not that there is an imminent threat, but it just would be bad policy to commit to giving this information before Iran has been accepted by the US as nuclear capable. The issue of Iran's refusal to ratify or implement the Additional Protocols is a relatively easy one to resolve when communication begins and will not be resolved before then.

Do I Exaggerate What the Saudis Could Do?

I wonder because I have a mental image of Saudi Arabia with a competitive political system being the lions of the Middle East.

The Saudis have a lot of oil, but they do not have nearly the population of Turkey, South Korea, or Brazil and somewhere around half the population of Argentina if you do not include foreign workers.

Australia has a population close to that of Saudi Arabia. Taiwan and Singapore are also similar in population size with Saudi Arabia. A competent Saudi Arabia could use its position in the oil market to ensure it has access to capital and technology on terms at least comparable to those of Australia and Singapore. An incompetent Saudi Arabia would end up with a position closer to Ghana on the scale of international power.

But a bunch of countries like Ghana together were the most important factor in ending Apartheid while Saudi Arabia is watching Zionism expand. I guess an incompetent Saudi Arabia has ended up in a position lower than Ghana's.

It is clear that all over the world monarchies do very poorly when they have to compete against modern political systems. It is also clear that most people in the world do not tolerate monarchies when they find their countries consistently being outcompeted.

But how much better would the Saudis be specifically? Would it have the powerful and modern high-technology armed forces that would be expected of a small population high resource country? Would it have the manufacturing capabilities of Taiwan or Singapore? And if it was this resourceful, how would a resourceful Saudi Arabia impact the rest of the region of the Middle East?

I wish I did but I don't have a good answer to those questions. I'm sure Saudi Arabia could be a lot more powerful than it is. But a mini-great power like Australia or Taiwan? Maybe, maybe not.

Certainly Saudi Arabia would have far more resources that could be used to handle the problem of Zionism, and the vast reduction of regional instability that accompanied the end of Apartheid would be reproduced to some degree in the Middle East if it did.

Annapolis Mideast Conference Next Week

This conference will have no impact on the ground. It's the type of event that the current Bush administration would hold.

The Arabs, mainly the Saudis, are trying to maneuver Israel and the United States to put their names behind a proposal, especially for the issue of the refugees. That will not happen either before, at or after the conference.

I'm rereading the narrative that the Israelis have become honorary Sunnis from the Saudi point of view. I have not read any statement by the Saudis or seen any action they've taken that implies that.

This conference does not strike me as an important event. It seems safe to say that before Annapolis equals after Annapolis. We'll see the end of the Bush administration not only without a comprehensive peace deal, but also without a proposal from any official Israeli or US source about how to deal with the refugee issue.

Why have these untalented foreign policy communities (in the US and the Arab world) attached such importance to it? Because this is the exact type of event that untalented foreign policy communities attach too much importance too. Communities that cannot wrap their minds around the idea that what happens on the ground is more important than appearances. The idea that appearing clever is different and less important than having an impact on the ground.