Predictions

Reading "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony", a New York Times essay whose message is pretty well contained in the title, I came across author Parag Khanna's predictions of the world in 2016.

It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.

I'd say these are more wrong than right. I'd say as a rhetorical point that predictions should never be used to advance an argument. I expect to see a decline in US power pretty much from now on, but that's probably hopeful thinking as much as anything. US power increased from 1980 to 1990. I'm not sure there is anything fundamental I can say about 2008 that I could not say about 1980.

So about the US overall standing in the world eight years from now. The US has less standing than it had last year at this time. Maybe that trend will continue, maybe it will not.

I really do not expect to see an independent Kurdistan. If there is an independent Kurdistan then I expect Turkey to take a major symbolic step against US interests. Something like closing a US base in Turkey, or joining a free-trade agreement with Iran or leasing a naval base to Russia. Something dramatic.

It is easy to predict that there will not be a pro-US government in Iraq eight years from now. I find it harder to predict how many US troops will be in ideologically hostile Iraq. The easiest guess is more than 100,000 troops. The United States invaded so that it could have leverage over the Iraqi government, and it needs a substantial amount of troops to do that.

The bases in the Persian gulf remaining is a pretty easy guess.

Afganistan being stable is unlikely. The Taliban being either routed or disbanded and territory where Taliban is currently influential being under the sway of Kabul is close to inconceivable. The US is more likely to pull out of Afganistan and leave it under a ruling arrangment negotiated between local groups, Russia, Iran and Pakistan. The most likely situation is that Afghanistan in 2016 looks a lot like Afghanistan in 2008. A lot of territory is contested. Not a lot of open warfare.

Iran being nuclear as in having a weapon is very unlikely. Iran being "nuclear capable" is a very easy guess, since Iran is "nuclear capable" today. It is easy to predict that Iran will receive more investment in its energy sector than it does today. US sanctions of some sort will continue to have some modest impact.

China absorbing Taiwan is very unlikely. China will steadily increase its commercial ties with Taiwan. Public opinion in Taiwan may be more favorable towards unification in 2016 than it is today. That is not a safe prediction though.

China's navy will be stronger than it is today. It will not be strong enough to capture Taiwan. The global naval balance will feel in 2016 a lot like it feels in 2008. The US will remain by far the most powerful naval force.

The EU may expand. EU access to gas will probably be secure, but access to gas is for the most part secure now. I guess that's a safe prediction. I'm not sure what unsecure access to gas would mean in the context of the EU.

In the Middle East, it seems that a consensus is forming that the US is not and should not be the only game in town. Saudi Arabia and now Egypt seem to be pulling out of the US orbit. I expect this to continue, but sliding out of an orbit is a gradual process and it is hard to predict what landmarks will have been passed in eight years if any. Egypt in particular will have a new leader in 2016. The safest prediction is that it will unfortunately be Mubarak's son.

2016 is a long way off though. I'm more interested in what 2009 will look like.

The United States is going to expend a lot of resources this year keeping both Olmert and Abbas in power. Once one is gone though, it can let go of the other. I'm confident that in two years, both Israel and Palestine will be represented by more radical leaderships. One year is harder to predict. I'm leaning towards either more radical elements of Fatah or Hamas being in power in the West Bank and Israel's right wing replacing Olmert by this time next year.

It is easy to predict that the United States will continue its policy of refusing to engage Hamas until Hamas renounces the right to return. And Hamas will not renounce the right of return. Forgetting morality, this is the most impractical possible policy for the US to take and it will take a toll on US relationships with other powers in the region while pointlessly leading to Palestinian and Israeli deaths that otherwise would not have occurred. US Gaza policy bears the mark of an exceptionally untalented administration in the US executive branch.

Next year at this time, Hamas will be in power at least in Gaza. One way or another goods will easily reach Gaza through Egypt. The weaponry and skill of anti-Israel forces in Gaza will increase substantially. It is possible but not quite probable that over this year rockets from Gaza actually are going to become routinely fatal to Israelis. I hope though that in two years, after a year without Bush and Rice, a long term cease-fire is reached that stops the rockets and ends the siege. This siege is comically stupid. It accomplishes nothing. It has to be the stupidest siege in history.

It is easy to predict that the United States will continue to insist that Lebanon's Shiites will not have proportionate power in Lebanon's government and that Lebanon's Shiites will not end the current stalemate as long as US allies in Lebanon reflect this position. This policy will pointlessly lead to Lebanese deaths that otherwise would not have occurred. In the end, the Shiites will have a veto just as smaller population groups do. This must be the stupidest political stalemate in the world today.

Next year at this time there will be a government in place in Lebanon. Hezbollah will not be disarmed and may be in the process of folding into the Lebanese army. Effectively, the Shiites will have veto power and there will be reforms to the electoral system. Nasrallah will describe it as a victory. I'll probably agree. In other words, the stalemate will have been broken in Hezbollah's favor.

I expect a pretty uneventful year in Syria.

Hopefully Kirkuk will not be part of Kurdistan this time next year. I'm optimistic that it will not. Most likely the postponements of the referendum in Kirkuk will be so routine that everybody knows the referendum is never going to happen.

2008 looks to be a good year in terms of not many US soldiers killed in Iraq.

Iran has informed the IAEA that it is testing a new centrifuge design. At this time next year there will be at least some operational. What Iran has now is really enough though, so getting a few hundred of another design running doesn't change the strategic picture at all. Of course neither the US or Israel are going to bomb Iran in 2008.

So we'll see by January 2009 how well these predictions held up.

Iran: We'll Have Relations with Israel After Zionism

If the Iranians and other Muslim anti-Zionists understood how effective it is rhetorically in the West to associate Zionism with Apartheid, they'd explicitly draw the comparison every single time their position on Israel comes into discussion.

Unfortunately, Zionism is aided, somewhat, in its efforts to keep Western support by Zionism's supporters having a better understanding of which terms carry which emotional leverage in the West than many of Zionism's opponents.

May steps toward closing this gap become a trend:

"Iran is not threatening Israel and does not want nuclear weapons, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Saturday.

... ... ...

The Iranian foreign minister went on to say that Iran did not recognize two countries, South Africa and Israel. "With South Africa, the problem was solved with the end of apartheid and if the situation also changes in the other case [Israel], there is no reason why relations with that country cannot change too," he added.

What She Said. She Being Helena Cobban.

I had expected 2008 to be a firework-less year in the Middle East. A stalemate has been reached in Lebanon that everyone is more or less comfortable with. An agreement between Abbas and Olmert cannot be reached because of structural reasons on both sides but they both have reasons to continue pretending to go through the motions. An agreement has to have been reached between the US and Iran over Iraq and Iran's nuclear program that both sides are comfortable with through the end of Bush's term.

But now Hamas has broken out of its blockade. This is Hamas' biggest victory yet. Bigger than winning the elections, bigger than getting Saudi support for a unity government and bigger than its removal of Abbas/Dahlan forces from Gaza. This is a huge victory that destroys the US/Israel/PA narrative that Hamas is stubbornly bringing destitution to Gaza and Palestinians should be realistic to accept US/Israeli terms for cooperation.

Helena Cobban's coverage of this has been by far the best I've come across in the blogosphere.

There's a joke from Europe in the early 1900s that a Jew asks another why he reads the anti-semitic newspapers. The reader says, "This is the only place I can go for good news. Look at this, the Jews control this, the Jews dominate that ..."

Israel's Debka File is becoming one of the best places for anti-Zionist news. They were an early source that commented on the obvious breakthrough between Iran and the US, but when they claimed earlier this week that Hamas would use the electricity crisis to take control of the Rafah border crossing I thought they were being overly alarmist. Turns out they were underly alarmist, as Hamas took down not the border crossing, but the entire border.

(Debka File is not perfect. I never believed their assessment that Israel planned and the US authorized an Israeli takeover of enough Gaza territory to establish bases that Israel would then turn over to Abbas. But Debka File gets a pass on that because even if it had been true, recent events would have forced the cancellation of those plans.)

I'm now shocked by the total lack of response from Israel and the US to this game changing development. I can only figure they are paralyzed by the scope of it and what it can mean.

1. At minimum blockades cannot work any more.
   
2. Israel now cannot prevent Hamas from delivering a better quality of life in Gaza than Abbas can deliver in the West Bank.
   
3. The hope that the Palestinian people would learn their lesson and never elect Hamas again has been dashed.
4. Hamas now has access to all the concrete it wants to build Hezbollah-style fortifications in Gaza - meaning an Israeli ground assault is moving off of the table.
5. Hamas can upgrade its rocket weaponry nearly without limit now.

Debka File reports these developments as, according to its Israeli military sources, "irreversible". This is a serious short, medium and long term setback for Zionism in that case.

Why the War Over the Legitimacy of Israel is Lost

In the long term, the US is not going to be able to get pro-US dictatorships over the entire Muslim world. Without pro-US dictatorships, the US cannot get governments that will adopt cooperative policies in the supposed "war on terror". Therefore the US will lose the Global War over the Legitimacy of Israel.

I doubt the US will ever successfully get even one more pro-US dictatorship than there is already.

• No pro-US dictatorship for Pakistan, (Musharraf having to become less pro-US for domestic reasons). The death of Bhutto emphatically marks the end of that dream.
• None for Palestine (pressure is already building for Abbas to accept Hamas in a unity gov't). The Arabs that the US needs to isolate Hamas are just not willing to do that.
• None for Lebanon.
• None for Iraq (Iranian-supported parties will at least be a stakeholder in the country, preventing the US from imposing a dictator who can go against Iraqi wishes on foreign policy)
• None for Iran (of course regime change is way way way off the table by now)

So since a loss is nearly certain in the long run, it is only a matter of time before US political class understands the impossibility of its global war and withdraws. The US will say in different words: "OK, we cannot convince you to accept leaderships friendly or even tolerant with Israel. What policies would the US have to pursue for you to accept leaderships friendly or at least tolerant of the US?"

This will be seen in Israel, accurately, as a spectacular betrayal or at least abandonment.

Unfortunately, the realization and withdrawal will not be this election cycle, even though some candidates, even a one-time front-runner, seem to see the writing on the wall.

Does Musharraf Benefit From Bhutto's Death?

I'm sure if Sharif had died while Bhutto lived, she would be holding power-sharing negotiations with Musharraf and publicly calling for elections while totally ignoring the Supreme Court and Pakistan's electoral law. I'm sure if only one was to die, Musharraf would have chosen Sharif. Given the choice.

If Musharraf can weather the coming attacks from Sharif on his own, then he might be better off because he does not in that case have to share power. It will be harder and more stressful though. I think Musharraf willingly made the trade and told the world he'd rather Bhutto be there when he allowed her return. Maybe, probably, Musharraf can maintain his grip on power despite opposition, but he'd rather not take the risk.

Even getting both would leave him worse off than if both were still in London. I can't see Musharraf benefiting, or thinking he would benefit from these assassination attempts.

I don't think the attacker expected to kill Bhutto. It is impossible to get close enough to a VIP car in a crowd of supporters to kill the VIP with a suicide bomb on a two-wheel vehicle. The planners of the attack could not have known that Bhutto would be standing out of the sun roof and that the attacker would get a clear shot. I think he carried the gun just in case, or maybe as part of a camoflauge police uniform.

I think the aim of the attacks was to scare people away from her rallies and Bhutto's actual death was unexpected.

Musharraf might have benefitted from an attack, but not a successful one. I'm sure there are many parties that cooperated to bring about the attack. Some pleasantly, maybe some unpleasantly surprised by the result.

A Whole Lot of Kurds Killed By Turkey

Turkeys claims to have killed 150 Kurdish fighters in its attacks on the mountains of Iraq.

Turkish airstrikes on Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq have killed more than 150 rebels and hit more than 200 targets in recent days, the Turkish military said Tuesday, countering Kurdish claims that only a handful of people were killed in the attacks.

My only question is how is Turkey sure it didn't kill 1,500 Kurdish rebels, or 1.5 million Kurdish rebels. If they're going to just make up numbers. Maybe the attacks did kill that many.

Of course Turkey knows it cannot accomplish any military objective by attacking dug-in mountain-based guerrilas from the air. This is pure theater aimed at accomplishing political objectives.

The first political objective is to rehabilitate the image of the United States and even Israel in the minds of Turkey's voters. I'm sure it has had some effect. I'm sure that will be countered the next time the Kurds mount an offensive. Kurdish offensives are set to become more deadly and more continuous over time.

A Turkish envoy said here Wednesday it was American intelligence that made Turkey's latest raids in northern Iraq on Kurdish rebels possible.

and

Personnel from Israel's Aerospace Industries are assisting the Turkish army in activating Israeli-made unmanned aircrafts for use in military operations in Kurdish northern Iraq, Turkish sources were quoted as saying in a report to be published Thursday in the Turkish Daily News.

The second objective is to pressure the US to pressure Kurdish authorities to order the guerrillas to curb their attacks. This is a short term effect that has happened, but guerrillas have ways to use the time productively.

The third objective is to pressure the US to pressure Kurdish authorities to give up Kirkuk. That may work, but Kirkuk is a luxury, not a necessity for Kurdistan. The Kurds have pushed the referendum back 6 months. This will become indefinite, but in the mean time the Kurdish non-oil economy and the oil they actually control will continue to fund the guerrillas who will resume attacks when they feel conditions are favorable.

DebkaFile Thinks US/Iran Deal is Being Reached

I come from a different ideological angle than either Debka or Stratfor, but there really is just not another coherent way to explain the December 2007 NIE. The difference is only in what various explainers think Iran got in exchange for working to calm down Iraq.

The Bush administration appears to be in the midst of developing a new foreign strategy based on five key elements:

1. The halt of Iranian weapons and road bomb shipments into Iraq for use against US forces;
   
2. An Iranian instruction to Hizballah to open the way for the election of a Lebanese president, in return for which Washington will not interfere with the formation of a new government with a place of honor for the Iranian surrogate militia.
   In other words, the Bush administration is not only engaged in a sellout of the Israeli government but also of the pro-Western Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora.
   
3. The cessation of Iranian arms and roadside bombs to Afghanistan.
   
4. The naming of Saudi Arabia as a channel for arbitrating American and Iranian differences.
   
5. A US pledge to backtrack on its charges that the Iran is engaged in developing nuclear weapons. This pledge was embodied in the dramatically revised US National Intelligence Estimate compared with its estimate of 2005, and effectively lifted not only the American military axe from over Iran’s strategic and economic infrastructure – and possibly regime - but also tied Israel’s hands.

That sounds about right. Iran did not and could not promise a long-term US presence in Iraq and in fact Bush can't guarantee that his successor will want a long term presence. The NIE bought a quieter Iraq until the next inauguration, or until the US pulls out which it will.

One quibble is that outside of Israel, the US does not really care about Siniora. Selling out Siniora is not separate from selling out Israel, which really seems to be what Iran demanded and got. Another quibble is that Israel's hands were already tied. And really the US' hands were tied as well, which is why the US has capitulated.

Barak Obama: Far Too Sensible to Be Electable

Would Barak Obama have won the US presidency if he did not hold this position? Maybe, maybe not. Is it possible that he could win with this position? Absolutely not.

And I've already said as president, immediately upon inauguration, I will begin to organize a summit with all the Muslim leaders around the world and have a direct conversation with them, our friends and our enemies, about how we can align the Muslim world against these barbaric actions, against terrorism. I believe that part of that will be to begin phasing out our occupation in Iraq, part of it will involve talking to actors like Iran and Syria, to get them to act more responsibly, part of it will be for us to shut down Guantanamo and restore habeas corpus and send a signal to the world that we're doing things differently. That's the kind of non-conventional thinking and approach that we're going to have to take to reverse the decline in our moral standing around the world that inhibits our ability to actually take on terrorism. That's what it's going to take to make us safer and that's what I intend to do as President of the United States.

The remaining question is will the United States continue to watch its global power decrease while losing its inherently unwinnable Global War Over the Legitimacy of Israel for four, eight or more years after 2008 is over?

Putin in Russia and Hu in China are hoping for at least eight. Olmert hopes the same for different reasons. The people of Iraq, Pakistan, the entire Muslim world and the United States would be much better off if it was shorter.

Sharif Exceeds Expectations

I wondered if Sharif was putting on a show when he asked Bhutto to boycott the elections weeks ago upon his arrival. If they are both on the scene, only one is necessary to give elections enough legitimacy to sustain Musharraf's rule and for one to participate without the other would give the participant a big relative advantage.

Sharif's return to Pakistan, obviously with the consent of Musharraf, indicated to me that a deal had been reached, and that deal would have had Sharif limit his steps to reduce Musharraf's legitimacy in exchange for being allowed back. I still believe Sharif could not have returned without an understanding. Musharraf otherwise could have refused to allow Sharif's plane to land, as Sharif once tried against Musharraf.

But on the day of Bhutto's death, Sharif calls for a boycott of elections and for Musharraf to step down. It was not a dance. Sharif really hoped both sides would boycott and now is free to boycott the elections himself.

Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif announced here Thursday that his party will boycott the scheduled Jan. 8 parliamentary elections after opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was killed in Thursday's suicide attack.

Of course the US opposes both a boycott and the removal of Musharraf from power.

The United States, in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's assassination, is urging all moderate Pakistani political forces including the party of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take part in the country's planned elections.

In terms of democracy, rule of law and effective governance advancing Pakistan's view of Pakistani interests, Sharif's recent behavior the best news to come from Pakistan since Musharraf took power.

Fuel Delivered to Bushehr

There seems to be a new dynamic in Iran's foreign relations beginning around the time of the NIE earlier in December 2007. One element of this is that Russia has begun delivering uranium to the Iranian nuclear plant in Bushehr.

The Russian company building the Bushehr plant, Atomstroiexport, said the delivery of the enriched uranium fuel began on Sunday.

The head of Iran's atomic energy agency, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, later confirmed that the first delivery had arrived, according to Iran's state-run Irna news agency.

It seems to me that an agreement has been reached between the US and Iran. If the US had enough leverage to prevent Russia from delivering fuel in March when the Iranians expected it, then the US has enough leverage now.

It seems that a decision has been made not to apply that leverage. It is possible that the next IAEA report will show that Iran has slowed its enrichment efforts and it is possible that Iran has done nothing except try to calm Iraq.

Do You Want the US to Win or Lose In Iraq?

US supporters of the occupation of Iraq from time to time accuse opponents of hoping for defeat for the United States. I have not seen a good answer to this accusation so far. I gather Juan Cole's response is to challenge the questioner to produce a definition of victory. Once a definition is spelled out, every definition of victory that has been presented so far can then convincingly be shown to be implausible. But that is a complex, multi-step process that Juan Cole can follow because he's bright. It is more likely to confuse than convince Americans who have vastly less background knowledge and interest in foreign policy than he has.

My answer is to give my own definition of victory. To the question "Do you want the United States to win the war in Iraq?" my answer is "Yes. I want the United States to win by establishing a secure democracy in Iraq."

But part of victory is that if Iraq's voters not want foreign troops they have the right and the power to instruct the foreign troops to leave. The United States has said it would remain in Iraq as a bulwark against Iran. If Iraq is a democracy, and Iraq's voters do not want to be a bulwark against Iran, Iraq will not be a bulwark against Iran.

In meetings late Wednesday with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Mr. Gates said the United States viewed Iraq, despite the close ties between some in its Shiite-dominated government and Shiite Iran, as a bulwark against Tehran, said a senior Defense Department official.

"Our Arab friends tend to see Iraq in the context of the new challenge from Iran," the official said. "That’s clearly the Saudi perspective. So the secretary was able to reassure them that we want an Iraq that is a barrier against Iranian expansionism."

Part of victory - part of creating a democratic Iraq - is giving up the idea of Iraq will or should, against the will of its voters, support the US vision of the Middle East.

Part of victory - part of creating a democratic Iraq - is accepting the idea that Iraq's voters may support Hamas and Hezbollah. Part of victory is accepting that Iraq may not accept a two state solution in Israel. Accepting that Iraq may not agree that Israel remaining a Jewish state is more important than returning the refugees. Accepting that Iraq may see the thousands of people killed by Bin Laden on 9/11 as a smaller crime than the thousands of people killed by Bush as a result of the US invasion of Iraq or by Olmert through the Israeli attacks on Lebanon.

Part of victory is the creation of a state that has the right to choose to be more helpful to Iran than it is to Israel, the United States or Saudi Arabia. And the fact is that Iraq's voters are likely to exercise that right if they are given it.

If supporters of the occupation want more than that, and they do, what they want is not the creation of a stable and democratic Iraq. What they want can only be given by an authoritarian dictatorship like those of Egypt and Jordan. What they want is to replace Hussein with a pro-US Hussein. Not only is the goal of supporters of the occupation immoral, but it is structurally impossible to accomplish - as Juan Cole can point out.

Is Bushehr Going Ahead? Also Russia and China's New Trade Announcements

I have to say I'll believe this when I see it.

Iran and Russia have resolved all disputes holding up construction of the Islamic republic's first nuclear power station at Bushehr, the head of the Russian contractor said on Thursday.

"The difficulties with the Iranian client are resolved and we have an agreement on the timetable for construction," said the head of the Atomstroiexport company, Sergei Shmatko, at a briefing with journalists.

... ... ...

"As we've already said the fuel will be delivered about half a year before the technological start up of Bushehr.

"As this theme is too politicised we have decided not to announce the date of delivery of fuel. You'll hear of the fact of delivery when it's delivered," Shmatko said.

Maybe. I'm not sure Bushehr will become operational before the US joins negotiations. And I don't expect that to be until after the Bush presidency is over. On the other hand, maybe this time the Russians have made a different decision.

My feeling though, is that China and Russia making announcements of increased trade with Iran is a direct result of the NIE.

China's Sinopec Corp has agreed to buy from National Iranion Oil Company about 160,000 barrels per day of crude under a one-year pact for 2008, nearly tripling the current level, a trading source said on Thursday.

"The deal has been finalised," the Beijing-based trading source close to the deal told Reuters.

and

Trade between Russia and Iran more than doubled in January-September 2007 to $2.2 billion, the Russian co-chairman of the bilateral inter-governmental commission said on Thursday.

Sergei Kiriyenko, who was yesterday appointed by the Russian president to head state-controlled nuclear power corporation Rosatom, and Iran's Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki chaired on Thursday a session of the inter-governmental commission.

The nuclear issue, from Europe's point of view is a short-term tactical consideration, but it is now risking a long-term strategic commercial and industrial alignment by Iran away from Europe towards Russia and China.

If Hamas Won, When and How Would We Know?

In South Africa, the ANC had won after the elections where Black people waited behind six hour lines and voted. Then those votes were counted and the ANC - which had been banned from politics the election before as a terrorist organization - took its position as the Parliamentary majority entitled to name the Prime Minister. At that point it was unarguable that at least the political element of the ANC's struggle had been won.

Everyone who could read knew by that point that the ANC had won. But astute observers who had been closely following events there may have seen earlier signs before election day that the dynamic had shifted structurally into the ANC's favor.

When the Apartheid authorities expressed an interest in releasing Mandela on the condition that he negotiate limited sovereignty homelands that could have been a sign for the astute observer. The most important attribute of the separate state homelands would have been that they would have isolated the White electoral majority from the Black demographical majority effectively under Apartheid control.

Mandela and the Black leadership rightly rejected the multi-state solution. But before the offer was made, changes had occured in the international environment that gave the ANC a long term position that was stronger than Apartheid's position. These changes were why the offer was made, and as soon as those changes were apparent, an observer would have had reason to expect an ANC victory. The struggle continued until election day, as did the need to remain vigilant, but there was a reasonable expectation of an eventual ANC victory earlier than that.

In the case of South Africa, domestic changes in the West and especially in the US made foreign support for Apartheid continually more scarce and less effective. Foreign support for the ANC was trending the opposite direction. When the direction of the trends became clear it also became clear that proponents of Apartheid would either have to negotiate a step-down or eventually lose a conflict of some sort that would force a step-down. This became clear before the ANC actually had more resources or effective support than Apartheid.

In the case of Palestine, we may have already crossed the point where support for the Palestinians, including Hamas, is trending up and effective support for Zionism is trending down. There has not been the domestic reframe of the conflict that occurred in the case of Apartheid in the US and Europe. It seems that opposition to Zionism may have become slightly more articulate but there is no wide perception, at least yet, that support for Zionism is morally despicable as support for Apartheid was before Mandela's election day.

But strategically, Iran is in a stronger and less vulnerable position today than any of the previous foreign supporters of the Palestinians.

On the nuclear issue, whether it was a mistake or deliberate, (I don't believe the United States is capable of making a mistake with consequences as clear, immediate and predictable as the release of the NIE when it did. For example, the US may have gotten a third sanctions resolution stronger than anything it will ever get from now on if it had released this NIE 90 days later.) the US has capped the pressure on Iran at a level Iran is clearly comfortable bearing indefinitely.

There is no longer a plausible scenario where Iran is not nuclear capable ten years from now. Before there was an idea that maybe the US will get really stringent sanctions, or maybe someone will bomb something. I've always considered both of these implausible scenarios but post NIE it seems every Western commentator and the Western foreign policy communities are willing to accept the conclusion that neither stringent sanctions or a military attack are available options.

More importantly but probably relatedly, the US position in Iraq and Afghanistan are effectively consuming all of US and Western available land forces. Iran if it wants, can maintain this situation forever. Iran can maintain this situation forever with nearly no effort, a tiny, deniable, undetectable amount of effort if it requires any effort at all. I'm sure China and Russia are privately counselling Iran to just keep them there.

From Western commentators today we are seeing increasingly frequent calls for negotiations with Iran. These calls for negotiation recommend the US make an offer of the form "we'll end unilateral sanctions if you stop supporting terrorists". This offer could be recast "adopt the Shah's foreign policy and we'll have the economic relations with you we had with the Shah". This is not a new offer. This offer was available at the lowest point of the Iran-Iraq war. Iran has and will always reject this offer.

Iran does not consider Hezbollah or Hamas terrorists. Even Saudi Arabia does not consider Hamas terrorists. If the US wants Iranian help removing the troops tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the price will be restoring normal economic relations without any reduction of support for Hamas. Which effectively means more support for Hamas as Iran becomes richer. But any negotiations will in any event wait until after George W. Bush, by far the most pro-Israel (to the point of irrationally pro-Israel) US president ever, is out of office.

So has Hamas won? US support for Israel has passed its high point. The US invaded Iraq when a strict consideration of only US material interests would have called for reaching an accomodation with Hussein. The US seriously worked to break Iraq apart (which though beneficial to Israel would be unbelievably detrimental to US material interests) and we'll learn in the next presidential term if it is still possible to salvage a united Iraq. The cost the US has paid ensuring Israel's long term security, with the very small long term benefits to Israel in return for the vast resources the US has expended, argues strongly against the US ever being willing to expend this level of resources again.

Meanwhile support for the Palestinians is increasing. Iran can expect at least the status quo. There will be no new costs for Iranian support for opponents of Zionism. Iran, in fact has leverage that will reduce the cost of its support for Hamas, Hezbollah and other opponents of Zionism. Saudi Arabia is signalling that it is at least considering welcoming Iran into its foreign policy graces which would mean more open support from the Saudis to opponents of Zionism. I think 2008 marks for Saudi Arabia a last-ditch effort to get an Israeli agreement the Palestinians will accept to prevent Saudi Arabia from taking a stance more like Iran's. Since there is no agreement that both the Palestinian and Israeli voters will accept, of course this last ditch effort has to fail.

Like the South African dispute when a large majority of the US Congress expressed opposition to Apartheid, today when nothing stands in the way of permanently increasing support for opponents of Zionism while foreign support for Zionism has reached a cap, an astute observer may see the signs of an eventual victory substantially earlier than the negotiations and election day that put an Arab majority and Prime Minister into Israel's parliament.

Difference of View on Iran and Israel

I found part of the Robert Gates question and answer session in Bahrain striking. (As reported by Reuters and other news services)

Asked at the Manama Dialogue conference whether he thought Israel's nuclear program posed a threat to the region, Gates replied: "No, I do not."

The statement was greeted by laughter from a room filled with government officials from Middle Eastern countries.

... ... ...

He dismissed the allegation that the United States applied a double standard on the nuclear issue by supporting Israel while calling for Iran to abandon its enrichment activities, which Tehran says are for peaceful purposes.

"Israel is not training terrorists to subvert its neighbors. It has not shipped weapons into a place like Iraq to kill thousands of innocent civilians covertly," Gates said.

"It has not threatened to destroy any of its neighbors. It is not trying to destabilize the government of Lebanon.

"So I think there are significant differences in terms of both the history and the behavior of the Iranian and Israeli governments. I understand there is a difference of view on that," he said.

"I understand there is a difference of view on that" means "though I've just stated my position, I do not expect you, my audience, to agree and the purpose of my reciting my position was not to convince you."

The purpose of that part of the discussion was not to convince the audience that Iran is more dangerous than Israel. The purpose was to get past an uncomfortable question without making it worse. "I understand there is a difference of view" is a concessionary request to the audience to help him avoid making it worse by vocally expressing a different view and/or asking any of the obvious follow-up questions.

The degree to which Israel is a burden on US efforts to get cooperation elsewhere in the Middle East may slowly be coming into view of the US policy community represented here by Gates.

France Is Not a Reliable Source on Russia or China

The French diplomatic corps, up to and including the President, is not doing a very good job these days. It really could be that the change to a pro-US orientation brought from the top has been too sudden. There is no question though that the French diplomatic corps is performing poorly these days.

Let's go back to October 9:

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, seeking to crank up pressure on Iran, said he had bridged differences Tuesday with Russia's Vladimir Putin over how the world should respond to Tehran's nuclear activities.

Sarkozy, on his first presidential visit to Russia, gave no details about the leaders' "convergences" on Iran or any signal that a quick solution to the international standoff is in sight. Russian officials made no public mention of progress.

But Sarkozy — who has toed a tough line on Russia recently — struck a decidely upbeat note after more than three hours of talks with Putin on a battery of touchy subjects.

"Our positions moved much closer together" on Iran, Sarkozy told reporters. He mentioned "many convergences" over Iran.

Much closer together. The next day we found out exactly how much closer.

"We do not have data that says Iran is trying to produce nuclear weapons. We do not have such objective data," Putin said. "Therefore we proceed from a position that Iran has no such plans but we share the concern of our partners that all programs should be as transparent as possible."

Oh. That much closer. One problem is that they've been that close for years now.

Enough, let's move to December:

According to a French diplomatic source in Paris, Friday's meeting between the two had been a "disaster," with Jalili signalling that Tehran wanted to start again from scratch on the issue.

... ... ...

A French diplomatic source said the new resolution would be a compromise between Western nations and China and Russia, and added that it could perhaps be agreed upon in the coming weeks.

And

In previous meetings Russia and China, which have strong trade ties with Iran, have agreed only to the mildest measures proposed by Britain, the United States and France.

The French diplomat said China's envoy had adopted a more constructive tone on Saturday.

It is coming to seem that the French have a habit of portraying the world as more favorable than it is. The gambit is that going public with the position you hope another party has may nudge the other party over if it is undecided. It backfires if the other party doesn't really hold the position you want.

China didn't immediately respond, and for a time, France may have hoped it was nudging China towards a new resolution. Those believing France's reports felt a Chinese agreement was imminent. The French probably didn't know what the US was going to do a few days later by releasing the NIE. But after the bomb had been dropped, before the dust had settled, we actually hear from the Chinese.

Pressed by reporters on whether the assessment might make new sanctions against Iran less likely in the near term, the Chinese diplomat said: "I think Council members will have to consider that, because ... now things have changed."

Larijani now says Jalili did not disasterously tell the Europeans that negotiations would have to re-begin from scratch.

"I spoke to Mr. Jalili and saw the transcript of the meeting, too," Mr. Larijani said, referring to Saeed Jalili’s talks with the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, in London on Nov. 30. Mr. Jalili replaced Mr. Larijani last month. "There was no such thing, and the Western media made it up," Mr. Larijani said.

'The transcript' means that the anonymous French source has been directly accused of lying and challenged to support that claim based on the transcript Larijani tells us exists. We'll see if the French respond.