Wednesday, April 01, 2009

Tony Blair: There Will Be A Big Fight

I've come across this idea before:
"The alternative to a two-state solution is a one-state solution. If there is a one-state solution there is going to be a big fight," said Blair, the representative of the Quartet of international mediators in the Middle East.

The idea that "a big fight" necessarily follows from the proposition that there will not be a specifically Jewish state in Palestine.

I think this idea is wrong. I cannot envision how this "big fight" is supposed to happen. I'm also intrigues by the question of why Tony Blair would believe this, or why he would say it if he does not believe it.

I can only imagine that the idea is that there is a threat that Israel is to be forced to incorporate the territory and populations of the occupied territories, that Israel will expel the Palestinians to Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and/or Syria, which would cause a war somewhere.

I can't think of anyone anywhere that I expect to support another Israeli expulsion of Arabs now or in the future. The United States would be the most supportive, but expulsion for ethnic reasons? That violently goes against the US' claimed ideals. It is comparable to US actions with respect to the Native Americans, but those actions are universally in the US looked upon with disdain. It is doubtful that the US would support similar action today, especially overseas.

Of course, Israel's neighbors would oppose such a step. I guess this is where the war supposedly would come from. Israel would not be in a position to "win" the war, by effectively driving the Arabs out without a lot of outside support. Israel's leadership would take the level of outside support into account in the decision to make such an attempt. The question really is would Israel's decision makers believe the necessary Western support would be forthcoming. I'll repeat that I doubt it.

So does Tony Blair believe Israel's leaders would expect Western support in expelling Palestinians?

My best guess is that he hasn't thought it through. I'm sure he would never say in public that he would support an expulsion because that would be in such violent opposition to the ideals of the people he represents.

A more correct statement by Blair may have been: "If two states fails, there may be a big fight if Israel expects that it can expel Arabs with at least tacit Western support."

Could Israel expect at least tacit Western support for an expulsion? I very strongly doubt it. In which case the alternative to two states is actually a relatively peaceful transition to a negotiated one state settlement.

Monday, March 30, 2009

Juan Cole: One State Solution Increasingly the Likelihood

Juan Cole giving a presentation with the Washington Note's Steve Clemmons. This is the first time I've come across him discussing the possibility of a one state solution. Juan Cole is in the liberal end of mainstream US thought about the Middle East, and the idea of a post Zionist arrangement is not unthinkable to him and apparently to at least that part of the US foreign policy community.

Isolated Statement:
23:23
So, I think personally that Israeli policy is digging its own grave and I think increasingly the likelihood is that you will have a one state solution ultimately.


Wider Context:
20:13
The situation in Palestine has deteriorated even since Obama has been in office, which isn’t very long. People tend to forget this it hasn’t been very long as I speak.

But a recent Lancet report came out suggesting that the Israeli blockade, which is a blockade of the civilian population, half of whom are children doesn’t let enough food in and there’s actual malnourishment among Gazan children There’s even evidence of stunting Some 10% of the children are stunted and in some parts of Northern Gaza is 30%.

This is a humanitarian disaster and it is the result of deliberate policy It is a war crime. You may not, in international law, collectively punish a population by half-starving its children to get a political result

And of course it’s been revealed that the Israelis have plans for 75,000 new housing units in the West Bank

And then the American side, Secretary of state Hillary Clinton says, we’re going to restart the peace process. I don’t understand. How would you have a peace process when there is ongoing land theft by one side of the other Even George W. Bush late in his term said the West Bank looks like Swiss cheese. That’s not a basis for a state.

And I admit this is a very tough nut to crack as are the issues that the United States has with Iran, but I think they’re actually all connected because if you really could make progress towards pace in the Levant, a lot of the problems the United States has with Iran would go away. I mean Gaza isn’t going to be interested in Iranian support if it’s not under that kind of blockade.

How to get forward on that Israel Palestine issue is a real question.

Now you have a very right wing government forming in Israel which has typically rejected the whole idea of giving back the West Bank and was opposed to the troop withdrawal from Gaza. So Obama is not going to have much to work with.

It seems to me that that issue will continue to fester. It will continue to cause terrorism And I believe that If you have a long term apartheid regime in the West Bank and the continued blockade of Gaza by the Israelis that ultimately the international community will begin imposing sanctions on Israel and I don’t believe that Israel will be able to withstand those sanctions. That is to say its economy is actually pretty dependent on its relationships economic, technological and diplomatic with Europe.

23:23
So, I think personally that Israeli policy is digging its own grave and I think increasingly the likelihood is that you will have a one state solution ultimately.

What’s not recognized in the United States typically is that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are stateless. And it’s not acceptable for them to remain stateless. The minimum necessity for a dignified life in the contemporary world is citizenship in a state. Without citizenship, without a state an individual has no real rights. And you can see this because Palestinian property is being taken at will every day.

And how do you even travel? You have to depend on the good will of countries to recognize your Laissez-Passer.

So it's not acceptable that 3 and a half million people in the West Bank and Gaza should be without citizenship nor that the ones, refugees in Lebanon and elsewhere should remain that way.

And you know it’s ironic because in 1938, 39 when Hitler took the Sudetenland, he stripped the Jews in Czechoslovakia, in the part of Czechoslovakia they took, from citizenship and they became stateless. And at the same time in 1939 the British government issued the white paper in which it called for restrictions on Jewish emigration to Palestine. And there was an uproar that you have now 100,000 newly stateless Jews and the British are not letting them to go to the one place where they could get papers. So statelessness was a human rights issue in 1938, 39. Statelessness should be a human rights issue today.

So I admit that the new administration has a set of tall orders before it.

Saturday, March 28, 2009

Obama's Speech in Muslim Capital

Barack Obama has promised to make a major speech in a Muslim-majority country in his first 100 days in office, which would mean April or May.

The easiest and safest bet will be that the speech will be comparable to the Nowruz speech, speaking vaguely and in general about respect, ideals such as democracy, opposition to terrorism and peace with neighbors (implying but not openly saying Israel).

He'll go as far as to endorse what he'll describe as a "just two state solution" to the dispute between Zionism and the Palestinians, then he may go further than most American public officials go, essentially to the limit of allowable discourse on the Palestinian issue by a United States politician, by saying he expects Israel to make sacrifices to bring this two state solution about.

For the US' sake I hope he does not go much deeper into the subject of Israel than that. Americans generally do not understand how far out of step their views on Israel are in the region. I have not seen any indication that Obama is significantly more self-aware than other American leaders. While we are safe in expecting there will be no Condoleeza Rice "Birth Pangs" moment in the speech, any full throated defense of Zionism or Israel will play into the hands of Bin Laden and Ahmadinejad.

There will likely be something like "we should move beyond the injustices of the past" which begins to be offensive as there are refugees and an occupation today and a recent mass killing of civilians in Gaza. He may go further and discuss "supposed injustices" instead of injustices, which would be worse. Pretty much from there, the more detail in which he states his or the US' positions on Israel, the more irreconcilable the country he represents will appear to be.

Bush had the luxury that it was widely understood that representative Americans are more moderate than he is. Obama does not, Obama is correctly understood to be the most balanced politician on the Middle East that the United States is for now capable of producing.

His problem is that in truth, his positions are not fundamentally different from George Bush's. The danger of speaking specifically about the disputes between the US and the Muslim world is that he will unwittingly prove hard-liners right that the United States is a country of vulgar and less vulgar people who think like Bush.

Most likely that won't happen. Most likely we'll get a nice, sufficiently vague speech that will be moderately well received but will not change the degree of opposition to the US in the region.

Saturday, March 14, 2009

Friends of Israel speak for Arabs

It is a constant irritation the degree to which supporters of Israel feel licensed to explain the secretly held positions of Arabs, which are, lo and behold, supportive of Israel, or of Israel's position on whatever topic is at hand.

Moon of Alabama - a site I can't believe I've gone this long without putting on my blogroll - has issued the definitive rebuttal of this phenomenon earlier this year, in much more detail than I've ever been bothered to delve in what always strikes me as a ridiculous assertion. Anyway, please read it if you have not already. The entry is called "Arab 'Fear' Of 'Nuclear Iran'?"

Most recently I see this over at Debka, but it has been a constant occurrence for years now.

Right after Washington signed its nuclear contracts with Saudi Arabia and the UAR, an official in region remarked: "The clear message to Iran is: If Tehran insists on pursuing its nuclear program, we the Arab countries in the region are going to have one, too although without enrichment."


"Although without enrichment?", then what message would that be sending? This is a really stupid statement that would be unlikely to appear no matter how lightly sourced from any government outside of the Arab world.

Monarchy is the most ineffective remaining leadership structure on Earth. I guess it was viable when at a time when education and the associated selection mechanisms were far more expensive than they are now.

Selecting a leader in advance allows that leader to be given the highest quality education a society is capable of offering, but carries the cost that the leader selected is not particularly likely to be internally talented.

In a world where education was expensive for everybody and monarchies competed against monarchies the cost of not elevating a nation's most talented individuals to leadership was bearable. It is not any more, except that the United States, the world's richest nation and the nation that devotes by far the most resources to furthering the Zionist cause, offers Arab monarchies a form of life support.

Ostensibly the support is for the relatively pro-Zionist stances these monarchies effectively take, even if their rhetoric does not match their positions. But more than that, if Israel is surrounded by millions of people who believe its creation was an injustice and that could effectively pressure Israel to accept the refugees and abandon it's Jewish identity, then having those people under poor leadership is an advantage in itself.

I'm sure these Arab monarchies perceive themselves as cleverly engaging a long-term struggle against Israel, but that they are smart enough to accommodate the reality that the United States is the most powerful country in the world and it favors Israel. Actually, the Arabs states, because they have pre-modern leadership structures are inherently easy for modern states to outmaneuver.

Until these leadership structures are modernized, which would entail a defeat of the regimes themselves and of the efforts and resources the US expends to maintain these regimes, the Arab states are and will continue to be non-issues in world affairs.

A bunch of retarded children who, if anyone cared to stoop to the level that they actually wants to take their candy, can just walk over and trade it for dust.

Effective governments, aligned or opposed, would speak for themselves. Debka could never claim to be the mouthpiece of the Chinese, Russian, Turkish or Iranian governments. None of those four have perfectly democratic leadership structures, but each has a competitive structure, in which the leader is the winner of a competition set up to elevate the person among millions whose talents and values match the standards and values of a substantial, nationalistic and somewhat objective group of judges - even if the judges are not the direct input of the people ruled.

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Happenings in the Greater Middle East

Egypt:
Debka is publishing claims that Egypt believes the recent attacks on Western tourists in Egypt were orchestrated by an Iranian agent or agents. There would be a lot for Iran to lose, and this has little to no upside potential for Iran that I can see. So I doubt it. Iran has both resources and the tactical skill to intervene far more effectively in Egyptian domestic affairs than this, if it was to want to try to influence Egyptian domestic affairs.

Egypt has one major issue that anyone outside of Egypt would care about - who will replace Mubarak. The US, on Israel's behalf is devoting and will devote tremendous resources to ensuring it is someone who, contrary to the wishes of Egypt's people, will, like Mubarak, follow policies acceptable to Israel.

Iran probably will not be able to compete with the US in Egypt when Mubarak dies, knows it, and therefore has no reason to sink resources in that country.

Egypt is trying to exert as much pressure on Hamas as possible to effectively recognize Israel or relinquish power in favor of the US/Israeli favorite Abbas. But Egyptians understand that the amount of pressure they can bare on Hamas is less than before Israel's December/January attacks.

If Egypt had not signed its treaty with Israel, it would not have gotten the Sinai back and would not now be in a position to break Israel's blockade on Gaza. Part of the agreement was that Egypt would not militarize the Sinai which means Israel could retake it if Israel felt it necessary. Israel's failure to hold hostile territory both in Lebanon and Gaza throws Israel's ability to retake the Sinai for any long period into question, but Egypt is right that some of its critics do not appreciate Egypt's position.

On the other hand, an Egyptian democracy, though it would not have signed the peace treaty in 1980, would certainly allow more goods to pass into Gaza today than Mubarak is. An indefinite dictatorship in Egypt is part of the cost of keeping Israel Jewish, and that cost is not generally accounted for when considering how expensive Israel's Jewish majority is to its American patrons.

Palestine:
Fayyad resigned and Clinton immediately told Israeli newspapers that she wants him back in any unity government. A clumsy move by Clinton that turns Fayyad into Abbas in one stroke.

Fayyad said he was resigning for the good of the Palestinian people. Hillary called him a liar, and she would know. Fayyad now will either publicly withdraw from consideration for a position in any unity government or he is a US/Israeli stooge, clear for everyone to see.

Israel:
Israel is stalling. In general and in most specific current situations. I'm not sure Shalit is alive, but Israel is in no hurry to get him back and for now likes the status quo in Gaza more than any other plausible outcome. The clock is somewhat stopped on everything until it is clear who speaks for Israel's government. Israel's calculation or at least hope is that the status quo is one in which the Palestinians are becoming more and more demoralized.

Long term, I don't believe it is possible for Israel to remain a majority Jewish state. The Arab population is still growing and Israel's neighbors have populations that are becoming more, not less, hostile to Israel. But from Israel's point of view, lasting as a Jewish state for 40 years is not the same as lasting 20 years. Even if they look the same 50 years from now.

Israel's best long-term strategy is to eek out as many years as possible until, maybe ten years from now, maybe 30, maybe 50 years from now a ball drops and Israel is forced to accept an Arab political majority. And who knows? Maybe they'll be able to change something fundamental between now and then.

Lebanon:
I've read in two different places that Western strategists believe Iran and Syria do not have resources to support Hezbollah's election campaign and therefore Lebanon's election will produce a pro-US government. I'll believe it if I see it. Hezbollah will retain its veto, I'm nearly certain. Will anti-US parties have enough influence to force reforms in the voting system? If not, Hezbollah can wait.

Britain also is talking directly with Hezbollah. Essentially the West is less hostile to that party than it was under Bush. That is good news for them, if only slightly.

Syria:
Western commentators are making a lot of the Hariri tribunals. I'm not seeing why. They may, probably won't, but may be able to get Assad out. If they do, they'll get someone just as anti-Israel as he is. If not more. Like Iran cannot compete with the US in Egypt, the US cannot compete with Iran, in maneuvering a succession, in Syria.

But there are talks and the West is notably, if slightly less hostile to Syria than it was under Bush.

Saudi Arabia:
The Saudis seem to be taking a strong anti-Iran line. It is hard to tell because the Saudis do a very poor job of communicating their positions. But if Iran removes a substantial amount of its sanctions while retaining its support for anti-Israel groups, Saudi Arabia will be forced, no forced is wrong because ideologically that is what they would prefer, but Saudi Arabia will also increase its support either for the same groups or aligned groups. Saudi Arabia will also join Iran in challenging Israel's nuclear monopoly if Iran can do that at a reasonable cost. Not because of an Iranian threat (Iran offered to supply any Muslim country with centrifuges itself) but because the price the West can exact will have gone down.

The Saudis are to a degree misunderstood by their critics in a way similar to Egypt. The Saudi strategy is to wait, applying fairly steady pressure on Israel but while avoiding direct confrontation with the West.

The problem is this strategy is too clever by half. All this time the Saudis think they are slowly but surely squeezing Zionism they are aligning with Israel against whomever Israel perceives as its most threatening enemy of the moment.

The Saudis would prefer Israel succumbing to an Arab majority 50 years from now, if over these 50 years, they get to dress up and have fun talking big to the West about how rich and important they are, to Israel succumbing sooner but with the West hostile to them. If left to the Saudis though, Israel would get 1000 years of being 50 years away.

Iran:
There are conflicting signals being released about Iran. The West will be less hostile than it was under Bush. How much less hostile? We won't know until we see.

Obama does not personally have the energy to be very active on Iran now. Reports are continuous that he is physically exhausted by domestic events. I expect to see slow moves toward reducing hostility.

The administration, by its default policy, is now trying to trade opening with Iran for international support for stricter sanctions. I'm not sure what Russia and China will be willing to give.

This can get tricky because if Iran feels threatened, it will make Iraq, Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan much more difficult for the US, and Russia and China know this and don't want this. We'll see.

Iraq:
Obama really plans on pulling out. This is like Condoleeza Rice and Bush calling for 2006 elections in Palestine. He really doesn't understand the extent to which a post-occupation Iraq will oppose the US vision of the region. Good. But I don't know what the scramble will look like when the US realizes what happened.

Afghanistan:
We're reading repeatedly that the US believes it is losing in Afghanistan. I guess now is the time it is possible to say such things, since it can be blamed on the previous administration. This is a massive effort to lower expectations. Good.

But the US does not really have a dispute with anybody in Afghanistan other than its support for Zionism. This Global War Over the Legitimacy of Israel is proving to be an expensive war for the US.

Pakistan:
Pakistan, Pakistan, Pakistan. I believe that people all over the world have a fundamental right to make their own mistakes, learn from them and demonstrate they learned from them in democratic processes.

I didn't like that Zardari won the election. I'm sure the US did all it could to push the election his way. But I also think the martydom of his wife allowed him to win by a genuine expression of support from his people. I do not think Sharif should resort to violence until Zardari suspends elections or flagrantly breaks a law of that magnitude.

On the other hand, I think the long protest march planned by Sharif is a valid and good expression of protest. The US is continuing to apply pressure on Pakistan to retain a pro-US leader such as Zardari and to insulate him from democratic pressure.

This tension between the US and the people of Pakistan over the rulership of Pakistan has the potential to be very devastating to Pakistan and very expensive to the US.

As always, a democratic Pakistan, even one that is sympathetic to Bin Laden, would not be a threat to the US but for the US identification with Israel. The disastrous chaos I hope we do not see but fear we might turn out to be another high cost of the war Israel's patrons are waging against the Arab and Muslim world on Israel's behalf.

Turkey:
Erdogan is one of the best politicians in the world today, clearly the best in the Muslim world. I'm not sure of the exact numbers of the upcoming elections in Turkey, and he may have more resources allayed against him than before but if anyone can turn Turkey into a representative Muslim democracy that sets its own foreign policy democratically, it is him. I'm somewhat optimistic about Turkey over the medium term.

Sunday, March 01, 2009

Arguments for Zionism: Responses

I come across a finite number of rationalizations or arguments for various aspects of the Zionist project and thought I'd put responses to those that I've come across in one place.

I very strongly request comments, additions and criticisms of this post. After several months of tweaking, I expect to post a far better version of this.

If anyone is able to entirely rewrite any of the responses, I would gladly replace my language with yours, within reason.

1. Jews were expelled by the Romans
The Romans were not a settler empire. The Romans conquered Spain, England, Germany, Egypt and other areas, replaced the rulers with a leadership structure loyal to Rome and left the inhabitants in place. Of Jews evacuated when Rome sacked Jerusalem, some may have gone far away but there is no reason most would not have stayed relatively close, other parts of Palestine or what are now Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon or Syria. There is no record of Romans ever expelling all or most Jews from the area now known as Palestine, and that had never been Roman practice anywhere, even after putting down rebellions. Judaism was a diasporic religion long before the Roman conquest. By the time of that conquest the number of Jews outside of Palestine likely already surpassed the number of Jews inside. After Roman conquests, the ethnic composition of conquered territories remained essentially unchanged. Over centuries some of the original Jewish inhabitants of the territory converted to other religions, Christianity, Islam or others, some left, other people migrated in. Some of the descendents of the Jewish inhabitants from before the Roman conquest remained continuously in Palestine even until the present day. Some descendents are Jews, some are descendents of Jews who converted along the way to Islam or Christianity and are now seen as Arabs. The idea that Jews were forced out of Palestine by the Romans to make way for another population in a process comparable to the expulsion of Arabs 1948 to allow a sufficiently majority Jewish state is simply false.

2. Arabs are also foreigners to Palestine
The Arabs were also not a settler empire. The Arabs conquered what are now known as Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan and other places, replaced the rulers with a leadership structure loyal to the ideals and culture of Arabia and left the inhabitants in place. These inhabitants, after learning the Arabic language and accepting the Arabs’ religion became known as Arabs themselves. The Egyptian population is now considered Arab. There was no large-scale replacement of the original inhabitants with settlers from Arabia. Egyptians became Arab when the original inhabitants adopted the Arab language and culture and converted to Islam. The Syrians became “Arabs” mostly through conversion. The Palestinians, including some descendents of Jewish Palestinians, became Arabs the same way everyone else in that area became Arab.

3. According to Mark Twain, the land that became Israel was nearly barren
There is a famous quotation from Mark Twain that traveling in Palestine he noticed that the land was “nearly barren”. Nearly barren doesn’t have much meaning other than “not uninhabited”. Does he mean less populated than New York or St. Louis at Twain’s time? Does he mean the population was less dense than the population of Native Americans whose dispossession from their lands the US was completing as he wrote? Taken on its face, Twain’s claim only means that there were some people in the territory. Other more careful studies of the population from around that time indicate that the population had a vast Arab majority. Even if the area only had ten people, that is enough that they had a right to reject an outside effort to give the territory to an outside group as that outside group’s homeland.

4. There is no historic Palestine. The land that became Israel was colonized by the Arab, Ottoman, British and other Empires.
The inhabitants of the territory, regardless of who ruled it, had and have a right not to be displaced. Further they have a right, if they choose, to remove their foreign colonial rulers.

5. The 1948 UN allocation was reasonable
The UN allocation clearly allocated land disproportionally to the Jewish state. The Arabs believed that in terms of the value of the land the allocation process was also skewed in favor of the Jewish portion. The Arabs also believed that regardless of the allocation, the Zionist movement was stockpiling weapons with Western help, to immediately cease more land and expel much of the Arab population the Jewish partition. Zionist theorists of the time did not believe a stable Jewish democracy state could be built with the slim majority The UN was an explicitly colonialist institution at the time. As it partitioned Palestine, the UN also decreed that the Congo would be restored to Belgian ownership, Vietnam and Algeria to French ownership and other colonial holdings to their European rulers. Arabs were over two-thirds of the population of the territory and if they did not believe the allocation was reasonable, then the allocation was not reasonable. The UN had no more right to determine for the Palestinians in the Jewish partition that they should be under Jewish rule than they had to determine that Angola should be under Portuguese rule.

6. There was no alternative available in 1948
The best alternative then would have been a one-state arrangement in which every individual has equality protection before the law and equal political power.

7. Jordan was given to the Arabs so all of Palestine should have been given to Jews
All of Palestine had a 2 to 1 non-Jewish majority. The people of Palestine had a right to reject the creation of a Jewish state on their territory and the violation of that right was an injustice.

8. The Palestinian refugees of 1948 left hoping the Arabs would win
People leave war zones for their safety. I'm sure they did hope a Jewish state would be prevented from being established on their homeland, but that does not mean they relinquish their human right to flee to safety and return.

9. Israel hosts refugees from Muslim countries
Some immigrants to Israel were refugees, others went voluntarily or were pulled by Israelis. A lot of immigrants came from countries such as the US and European countries that clearly are not refugees. Some were, some were not, none left war zones comparable to Palestine in 1948, but a right to return or compensation is the individual right of any Jew who left any Arab, Muslim or any other state involuntarily.

10. Israel’s war for independence was a war of self-defense
Israel fired first. The first organized military actions were perpetrated by Jewish military groups, in many cases against Arab civilians, months before any Arab organized military even began preparing to intervene.

11. Israel’s subsequent wars were wars of self-defense
Using the rule that the first party to fire started the war, Israel fought a war of self defense in 1973. The US invasion of Iraq was described as self-defense by its architects. Japan believed it was forced to bomb Pearl Harbor in self defense. The side that fires first started the war is a rule that is generally accepted to apply to every conflict other than wars involving Israel.

12. Descendants of refugees should not be eligible for refugee status
This is a difference of opinion between supporters of Israel and most of the people in the region. The fact of the matter is that Jordan and Egypt are lead by dictators who are nearly comically subservient to pro-Zionist interests. But they are not accepting the refugees. The argument that these refugees should be accepted by Israel is stronger than the argument that they should be accepted in Egypt, Jordan, Syria or Lebanon since none of these are the states they or their relatives fled. Since the founding ideal of Israel is that a group that had a sovereign state in that territory thousands of years earlier had a right to return, it is hypocritical, and certainly seems hypocritical in the region to say that descendants from 60 years ago should not have a right to return because they are of the wrong ethnicity.

13. Israel was a strategic asset for the US during the cold war
The USSR was a militantly atheistic country. For religious reasons, the Middle East would have much more naturally aligned with the US against the USSR in that struggle. Middle Eastern actors always displayed a level of discomfort in engagements with Russia because atheists are very strongly condemned in the Muslim religion. Nasser, before the 1967 war with Israel told an audience of trade unionists that the only reason he aligned with the USSR is because the USSR took a better stance than the US and the US’ NATO allies with respect to Israel. The United States was able to maintain the cooperation of many Middle Eastern dictatorships despite the unpopularity of its ties with Israel, but from Israel’s inception, US goals have been more difficult to reach in the region because of Israel.

14. Israel is a strategic asset for the US today
Israel borders countries that do not have large supplies of oil or an ability to block oil flow from the Persian Gulf. But Israel inflames opinions of the populations of countries that are strategically important to the United States. Israel has never used its military, in 60 years, to assist in securing either supplies or transport of oil. Israel makes alliances more difficult and expensive to maintain, but for example, could not participate in the US invasion of Iraq. There really is no fundamental dispute between either Arab Nationalism or Islamism and the West other than the legitimacy of Israel.

15. The dispute is perpetuated by Arab leaders who want to divert attention from their failures
Iran was ruled by a US-installed stooge for a generation, but Iranians still do not accept Israel’s legitimacy. Saudi Arabia would prefer its people to de-prioritize the Palestinian conflict, since Saudi Arabia often sides with Israel against the wishes of the Saudi people. Jordan and Egypt have sponsored government campaigns explicitly to persuade their people that cooperation with Israel against other Arabs is an expression of putting their country first. No poll in any country ruled by relatively pro-Israel leaders has shown these efforts to be effective.

16. There are two legitimate national causes that must be accommodated at least with a Jewish state.
It is difficult to believe that in 1890 Jews who were a small minority of the population of the territory had a legitimate national right to a state in that territory. This claim would be comparable to a claim that Scientologists in the United States have a national right to a state comprised of some US territory. It is more difficult to believe that European Jews of 1890, some descendants of converts, some descendants of people who left Palestine voluntarily and some descendants of people removed by force thousands of years earlier, had a national right to a state in that territory. That is comparable to a claim that an American group believing in Norse mythology have a legitimate right a homeland in Scandinavia, even at the cost of displacing the current population of mostly Christians and atheists there. Today, Jews in Palestine have a right to remain in safety. But they do not have a human or national right to a permanent political majority any more than White Americans have a right to a permanently White US presidency.

17. Every other nation has a state
Many distinct ethnic groups and religions comparable to Jews do not have sovereign states. Mormons, Kurds, Zoroastrians, Afrikaaners, African-Americans, Blackfoot Native American Indians. This statement relies on a strange definition of “nation” to mean groups of people that have states, plus Jews whether Jews have a state or not. There is no reasonable definition of "nation" for which Jews are the only "nation" without a state.

18. It is possible for Palestinians to convert to Judaism
It is effectively impossible for Palestinians to convert to Judaism to get a right to return to Israel as citizens. Conversions to Judaism in Israel must go through a far more stringent and arbitrary process than conversions to Judaism in Western countries. Very few or no Palestinians have successfully converted to Judaism despite the obvious material advantages such a conversion could give them.

19. Other countries have an ethnic basis
The problem with Israel is not its ethnic basis. The first problem is that there is a large group of people that wants to return, but cannot because it is of the wrong ethnic group. The second problem is that preventing the people of the region who agree that the refugees should be able to return from expressing their will requires vast expenditures of resources by the US and other Western countries that leads to a tremendous amount of oppression and misery throughout the region. Israel’s victims are more than the 5 or so million non-Jews living under occupation and the 4 million refugees outside of occupied territories. They include the 80 million Egyptians, 6 million Jordanians and 25 million Saudis forced to live under pro-US dictatorships, shored up by US intelligence organizations, in order to keep the region safe for Israel. They also include the millions of Iranians whose economy the US has steadily attempted to thwart since the Iranian revolution to ensure Iran has fewer resources with which it could confront Israel.

20. There are dozens of Muslim countries but only one Jewish country
There are no Mormon countries. There is no universal principle that every religion should have a certain number of countries where it should be the majority.

21. Israel is small compared to non-Jewish land in the region
There is no size smaller than which it is not an injustice to displace one group of people to make room for an ethnic homeland of another group of people.

22. Israel is the only democracy in the region
Including people under Israeli control but excluded from Israel’s political process, Israel disenfranchises nearly a majority of its people because of their ethnicity. The United States also supports dictatorship and opposes democratic reforms that would make Israel’s neighbor more reflective of the commonly held belief among their people that Israel as a Jewish state is illegitimate

23. Israel is an economic miracle
Israel has been the recipient of many economic and trade advantages from the West, beyond the annual billions of dollars that are directly given to that country. Israel trades with the West on better terms than its neighbors, possibly because of Western decisions that Israel should have an economic lead over its neighbors.

24. Opposition to Israel is anti-Semitic
It seems that way to people emotionally tied to Israel. Really anti-Zionist arguments are no more inherently anti-Semitic than anti-Apartheid activism is anti-Afrikaaner. However, people who identify emotionally with Israel do feel attacked when anyone expresses doubt about the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state. While this may not be a rational feeling, it is a valid feeling that should be anticipated and respected. Those who advocate ending Israel's status as an ethnic state should take extra care to express that they do not believe that Jews are inherently bad in any way and that they do not harbor animosity against the Jewish religion, ethnic group or Jewish individuals. Attacks on Zionism often create the honestly held but usually incorrect perception that the source of the attacks hates Jews.

25. Martin Luther King, Jr. said anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism
He may have, in which case he was wrong. None of his recorded speeches indicates such a view. Of all of the things he wrote, he never himself wrote that on paper. There is a purported letter that is now widely understood to be a hoax, that never appeared in the magazine to which it is attributed. There is a recollection of a supporter of Zionism of King supposedly saying something similar at a dinner party. King is not recorded as being in the Cambridge area at the time the dinner party in Cambridge supposedly occured. One of King's associates recalled a private conversation but first discussed the memory publicly decades later. Possibly King felt that way. He never wrote it down in his own voice. If he felt that way he is just as mistaken as anyone else who feels that way. There is still no inherent animosity towards Jews required to believe there should not be an explicitly Jewish state in Palestine created at the expense and against the will of Palestine's non-Jewish residents.

26. The Hamas charter calls for killing Jews
Hamas’ charter notes a passage in the Koran in which Arabs kill Jews. The passage taken alone does not specify if these are Jewish civilians or soldiers. Elsewhere the Koran explicitly forbids killing civilians. The interpretation most consistent with the Koran on the whole is that these are soldiers. Nothing in the that passage, anywhere else in the Koran or the Hamas charter indicates that it should be interpreted as meaning all Jews will or should be killed. Hamas officials have repeatedly stated that Jews who choose should be free to live safely in an Islamic state. There is no reason to believe Hamas would not be able to impose its views even in an single state in which all the refugees vote assuming Jews would vote against them, but a constitution could be designed, as constitutions have been designed in many places throughout the world, that protects Jewish rights and has individual protections that cannot be outvoted by a majority.

27. Israel is the only way to prevent discrimination against Jews
Israel is not today a safer place for Jews than many other places, including the United States. Discrimination is a serious problem that cannot be solved by trying to carve majority states for every ethnic group that has or could suffer discrimination.

28. Abandoning Israel would lead to regional wars
This is a failure of imagination. A commitment to a orderly and gradual move to a one-person one-vote state including refugees over a set period of between a decade and a generation would end the source of the dispute over Zionism. Hamas and other anti-Zionist groups accept that they will not defeat Israel in the short term and have already offered a hudna, or to stop fighting for an extended period. A commitment to, at a set point in the somewhat near future, end Israel's Jewish-majority status could end all fighting against Israel this year.

29. Jews would be forcibly removed in any non-Zionist outcome
This is clearly false. It is easy to draw an outcome that does not require Jews to be removed. Jews would have a right to leave. And Middle Eastern opponents of Zionism often make the point that if the United States believes it is critical that there be a homeland with a guaranteed Jewish majority, Jewish political rule and automatic acceptance of Jewish refugees, the United States can set aside some of its own territory for that. If there is a Palestinian majority, Jewish people who do not mind living in a state with a non-Jewish majority in Palestine would of course be free to remain.

30. Jews do not want to, and should not be asked to take the risk that they might be oppressed in a post-Zionist Israel
Israel cannot defend its status as an ethnic Jewish state on its own. Israel requires huge sacrifices from its patrons. There are many costs involved in the US and its allies ensuring that Israel has the military and economic advantages over its neighbors it needs to be safe. For example, in terms of missed opportunities for trade and resources devoted to ensuring that Iran does not become more able to comfortably confront Israel, or the costs of helping Egypt's unpopular but relatively pro-Israel dictator remain in power, or the moral cost of allying with nations that openly torture any of their own anti-Zionist citizens such as Jordan, it would probably be probably more efficient for the US to use fewer resources to arrange a long-term guarantee of the individual rights of Jews in a non-Jewish majority state.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Cynical vs. Naive Two-Statism

A two state solution to the conflict between Zionism and Palestinians is structurally impossible to reach. A secure Jewish state requires concessions the Palestinians are not able to make. An independent Palestinian state requires concessions the Israelis are not able to make.

A great Palestinian, a Palestinian Mandela could offer Israel a secure existence in one state, but even a Palestinian Mandela could not offer Israel that the Palestinians would accept being consigned to cantons without connection to the outside world except through Israel and demilitarized except for a small Israel-approved police force. A great Israeli, an Israeli DeKlerk could offer Palestinians equality even in greater numbers than Jews, but could not offer an independent sovereign neighboring state full of people who resent their relatively recent dispossession.

A two-state solution cannot happen. Nobody has yet put together a plan that is acceptable to both Palestinians and Israelis because such a plan cannot exist. Israeli security and the independence of the people who were dispossessed by Israel, while continuing that dispossession, are mutually exclusive ideas.

Interestingly, two different currents of two-statism are forming. Naive two-statism, held by Western liberal supporters of Zionism, and cynical two-statism which I learned of recently through Helena Cobban's website and which is implied by Michael Totten through Totten's exposure to, according to Totten, a preponderance of unnamed Israelis.

Naive two-statism is exemplified by the dreams of a two-state solution held by Juan Cole and Helena Cobban. Neither of them can produce, have ever seen or could specifically imagine a plan that they believe would be acceptable to both Palestinians and Israelis. Yet they cling to the idea that a little more negotiation will produce such a plan.

Naive two-statism is a failure of imagination more than a moral failure. Naive two-statists have accepted the idea that there, in some cosmic sense, "should" exist a Jewish state - not for reasons that could withstand close scrutiny, not for reasons they'd attempt to put to words, but because that's what the people they've grown around have accepted without question thus far in their intellectual growth.

That there may not be a Jewish state in Palestine is an uncomfortable idea for them. For one thing, they would not want to oppose views held with great emotional intensity by Jewish colleagues that they both respect and want to get along with. The accusation of anti-Semitism is reflexively and sincerely invoked against any idea that makes a Jewish person feel uncomfortable as a Jew, even if the triggering idea does not involve anti-Jewish sentiment. This idea - that Jews could be outvoted by non-Jews in Israel - automatically, reflexively and sincerely, though wrongly, triggers accusations of anti-Semitism from Jewish supporters of Israel.

It is an idea that many liberal Westerners have taught themselves to avoid. Many have even acquired an ability to avoid the idea of a world without a Jewish state without consciously realizing it.

I guess here I can say that Jew and Zionist are not synonymous, but they are not fully independent concepts either. Many, probably most, Jews feel an attachment to Zionism that transcends the rational. This is not meant as an indictment. Many, probably most, African Americans feel an attachment to Black South Africans that is greater than they "should" feel by some race-neutral measure. Many, probably most Arabs and most Muslims feel an attachment to the Palestinians that is greater than they "should" feel.

And to go a little further off course, I may have raised the question of what happens when everybody is biased. Mandela is biased towards Blacks. Botha, Reagan and Thatcher are biased towards Whites. Maybe nobody is right. But no, somebody is right. The side calling for one-person one-vote is right. And if Blacks deny political representation to Whites in South Africa because of race, then the advocates of White people in that case will be right.

Back to naive two-statism. Cobban and Cole are not Jewish though. Their naive two-statism does not spring directly from their emotional attachment to Zionism but from having grown intellectually in an environment that has been disproportionally Jewish. An environment where anti-Zionism automatically triggers accusations of anti-Semitism. Many Jewish liberals, probably most, also engage this naive two statism for their own emotional reasons.

The practical sense of naive two-statism on the part of Westerners, is that it provides moral cover for the continuation of a morally unacceptable situation. The United States is aiding Hosni Mubarak in keeping 80 million Egyptians under an authoritarian dictatorship. This should be violently contrary to US ideals, but if an agreement is right around the corner, this is a short term sacrifice that will lead to everyone in the region accepting Israel, and so is worth it. It is not defensible if it is what it truly is, a situation that must continue indefinitely if the 6 or so million Jews of Israel are to be securely safe from being outvoted by Palestinians. There are many examples where in the Western liberal mind, the costs of Zionism are mitigated by the untrue but naively held idea that peace is a few negotiations away.

But cynical two-statism. This is a concept that is newer for me. In a comment at Cobban's blog, Michael Totten left:
The American Jewish Committee brought me and seven of my colleagues to Israel and set up interviews with Israeli military officers, politicians, academics, and journalists on the far-left, the far-right and at every point in between. One of my colleagues asked the eternal question during one of our meetings. “What is the solution to this problem?” He meant the Arab-Israeli conflict, of course, and the answer from our Israeli host was revealing in more ways than one. “You Americans are always asking us that,” he said and laughed darkly.

Americans aren't the only ones who have a hard time grasping the idea of an intractable problem. “Unfortunately we Westerners are impatient,” said an Israeli politician who preferred not to be named. “We want fast food and peace now. But it won't happen. We need a long strategy.” “Most of Israel's serious problems don't have a solution,” said Dr. Dan Schueftan, Director of National Security Studies at the University of Haifa. “Israelis have only recently understood this, and most foreign analysts still don't understand it.”
From Totten's point of view, moral deficiencies of the Palestinians are the reason a two-state solution is impossible for the forseeable future. Totten has a right to interpret things that way if he chooses. No group of people on Earth in the Palestinian's situation would accept what Israel offers but if it comforts Totten to believe the Palestinians are morally subhuman in some way, who can stop him from believing that?

But regardless of the reasons - I consider them reasonable, Totten considers them immoral - if no two state solution is available, then the remaining alternatives are the status quo or a one-state solution. In this case, opponents of a one-state solution, which Zionists who do not call for mass expulsions or apartheid must be by definition, must either present that the status quo is the best possible arrangement, or cynically allow naive two-statists to continue believing a solution is available while understanding that one is not.

How widely have Israelis come to understand that there are no prospects for a two-state solution - regardless of where they assign the blame?

If Peres has reached the conclusion that two states cannot be reached, or Livni or Olmert, then they are now cynical two-statists. They understand the importance of the ability of naive two-statists to pretend the status quo is temporary and go along with the idea to manipulate those who would not deliberately support the indefinite continuation of the status quo.

I don't know for sure if Peres is a naive or cynical two-statist. Totten is neither a naive or cynical two-statist, he is an advocate of the indefinite continuation of the status quo. Lieberman is an advocate of expulsion. Both are unacceptable to Western sensibilities. I expect that some two-statists, aware that there is no alternative to two-states that is both acceptable to Zionism and to Western sensibilities, have decided to cynically pretend that two states are possible while aware that they are not.

Monday, February 23, 2009

The Two-State Mirage

These days I'm finding myself amused at the vehemence with which otherwise liberal westerners hold to the idea that a two-state solution to the Palestinian conflict is just around the corner. For several years, the refrain has been "everybody knows what it will look like, they just have to ...".

Now that Netanyahu is poised to take over Israeli politics, the conditions liberal Westerners have claimed would have to be met for a viable two-state solution to appear clearly will not be met. There will not be significant pullback from the settlements, and there will not be a contiguous West Bank, instead the West Bank will be a series of cantons, with not direct access to each other, much less to the outside world.

The Palestinians would not have, without duress, voted for a contiguous West Bank/Gaza state without a right to return that would threaten Israel demographically. The West has always intended for the vote to be under extreme duress - the Palestinians are to be told that the alternative is to starve. A vote under duress will not be accepted as legitimate and the feeling that there is still an injustice to be rectified will continue throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

Another issue on the side, is that most Palestinians believe the refugees are part of the Palestinian nation that should be included in the vote. Including them guarantees that any referendum will fail. Westerners have no intention of including them.

A two-state solution is just not practical. The Palestinians are not going to accept what Israel is willing to offer without an amount of compulsion from the West that will render any vote meaningless. It isn't really less practical under Netanyahu than it was under Olmert. It isn't and wasn't going to happen either way.

This is an issue Westerners are able to avoid by through the belief that negotiations are going to, at some point in the future, and by magic, create an arrangement the Palestinians will find acceptable but that does not threaten Israel. I've never seen such an arrangement spelled out in detail, even as a discussion of what would be plausible.

The purpose of the two-state solution, now, seems to me to be a mechanism for indefinitely maintaining the status quo, but reducing the guilt associated with the ongoing dispossession, starvation and violations of the Palestinians.

Advocacy of a two-state solution that will agreed to right around the corner is a relatively guilt free way to advocate the status quo. What we have now is the two state solution we'll have in the future. Egypt's people would not accept what the West would present - meaning a compelled referendum - so Egypt's 80 million people will have to remain under pro-American dictators indefinitely. Same for Jordan and the rest of the region. Palestine's people would have to live under their own pro-Western dictatorship, because free to vote, they'd elect parties opposed to this outcome. There would be resistance on the same fronts that exist now. There is no difference between what the Middle East would look like after the Western vision of a two state solution and what we see today.

Sunday, February 15, 2009

US Missile Defense and Russia

There are some statements that I put under the category "weird lies". Things that a party says that clearly are not true even though nobody important believes them. Often it seems to me that the United States foreign policy establishment is advancing weird lies. This may be a result of my having different biases than most members of the US foreign policy establishment.

But there is a weird lie that is often repeated that the US wants to install anti-missile systems and Poland and the Czech Republic as a defense against possible Iranian missiles at some point in the future.

Russia has been clear from the beginning that it perceives a threat not from the small number of interceptors, but from the radar that will be integrated into the US' global missile detection system and thereby provide earlier warning than would otherwise have been available of any Russian launch. Essentially this move is seen as a step to remove the US-Russian mutual first strike capability.

If it is technologically possible for the US to render itself invulnerable to a Russian attack, the US must do so. No US leadership could pass up an opportunity to do so. An equilibrium where the US and Russia both are able to destroy each other but neither does is only a second-best outcome. If the US can remove the threat, it must.

If the US cannot remove the threat, then and only then is it rational for the US and Russia to restrict missile defenses. If there is going to be mutually assured destruction anyway, US leadership is able to compromise with Russian leadership to accomplish that equilibrium less expensively.

It appears that US strategists are reaching the conclusion that the US is now, or will in the plannable future be, able to degrade Russia's first strike potential in a way that Russia will be unable to match. In that case, the US must move in that direction.

So why not say publicly "our assessment of Russia's ability to pace us in an arms race has changed and it is now our responsiblity to go for a unilateral first strike ability"? I'm really not sure what the answer to this is. To say instead, "we're putting missile sensors on the Russian border to defend against Iranian missiles that may someday exist" strikes me as a weird lie. I truly do not understand the motivation.

The current equilibrium in which both the US and Russia have first strike capabilities is the most important foreign policy objective for Russia. There is no single issue that can increase Russian hostility towards US policy than this. On the other hand, if it is possible for US citizens to be impervious to a Russian first strike the US must go in that direction. There really is no choice on either side.

This means that the US will move forward with its missile defense plans, as it must, and Russia will be alarmed and strike back at US interests. It is hard for a bargain to be reached where Russia increases its pressure on Iran in exchange for missile defense because no US administration can credibly commit to forgo missile defense if it is feasible. In exchange for anything.

But if the US is going to attempt to achieve an unmatched first strike capability, Russia does have an interest in the Middle East being as much of a drain on US resources as possible. Israel is a drain on US resources that Russia can make more pronounced by strengthening Iran and Syria. I think we're seeing this trend now and will continue to see it through the end of the Obama administration.

Friday, February 13, 2009

Random Paragraphs

I don't have a feel for Barack Obama's Middle East policy yet. Obviously US policy will be mostly similar to US policy under Bush, which was fundamentally similar to US Middle East policy under Clinton and previous US presidents. But, for example, my guess is that Israel would have reentered Gaza if Bush was president or even if McCain had been elected and did not under Obama. The Gaza war, Netanyahu's rise in political power and a more pliant tone from Iran beginning with a new Iranian president may also have some impact in the future.

***

There also seems to be a softening of tone in Iran with respect to the US that is somewhat recent. Dennis Ross has not been officially announced as the senior Obama administration official regarding Iranian issues. If he is announced in that position, clearly it will be a setback and if not, it will be a reflection of communication that is not occurring between the US and Iran.

The US has unofficially announced that it has covert plans to sabotage Iran's enrichment facilities. The plans are less news than the fact that the plans were disclosed in the New York Times, and not even by Hersh as the New Yorker. My take is that an unofficial disclosure of their existence is a necessary condition for an offer to cease these efforts. They are related to talks in some way, because for there to be bluffing, there has to be communication. This disclosure was either a threat or part of a dance whose goal is a diffusion of tension. From here I can't tell which, but the target of this message cannot have been Israel, which has much more reliable ways to get insights into the US perception of its position with respect to Iran.
This account of the expanded American covert program and the Bush administration’s efforts to dissuade Israel from an aerial attack on Iran emerged in interviews over the past 15 months with current and former American officials, outside experts, international nuclear inspectors and European and Israeli officials.
Khatami's run in Iran, and his expected victory, may be part of an Iranian effort to communicate back with the West. We'll see how the dust settles at some point this year. A US lurch towards Iran, similar to the 2007 NIE, will indicate that an understanding has been reached behind the scenes.

***

The Democratic Party consensus, at least according to Matthew Yglesias, is that previous US presidents have been too cooperative with Bibi Netanyahu. A rightward swing in Israel's political system will alienate Israel from its supporters. I'm not sure how much and I'm not sure what the final result will be.
My understanding is that the big divide in Democratic circles is between people who don’t really like Bibi, and people who feel that those people were too soft on Bibi last time around.
***

It is becoming widely accepted that an Israeli two-state solution with Palestinians may not be possible. Netanyahu's rise accelerates that perception in the West. If a two state solution is not feasible, the West markedly prefers a one state post-Zionist arrangement to either the status quo or ethnic cleansing to allow a Jewish one-state solution.

Jews in the West are more generally fervent in their support of a Jewish state for its own sake than non-Jews. Non-Jews in the West support a Jewish state, but more than Jews, they support a two-state solution with a Jewish state out of a conviction that a one-state solution is impractical. As a two-state solution begins to be seen as impractical, I expect greater divides to become apparent between US Jewish and US non-Jewish perceptions of the region.

Non-Jews generally do not perceive a necessity for the world to have a Jewish state as greater than the necessity that the world should have a Roma (gypsy) state or even a sovereign Creek Native American state. Jews, even if they cannot rationalize it, emotionally proscribe a special importance to the existence of a Jewish state.

***

It seems that anti-Zionists have made relatively better use of the internet than Zionists. My explanation is that while there has always been information to support either position available, anti-Zionists have had a relatively more difficult time interacting and coordinating with each other. While the internet makes interacting and coordinating easier for everyone, for Zionists, the advantage over what was available previously is smaller and relatively is negative. The time when most acknowledged Western Middle East experts are sympathetic to Zionism continues. But it is more possible today to create a convincing argument (meaning convincing to people in the West) that the acknowledged Western Middle East experts are wrong than it was ten years ago. "Wiped off the map" is an example of this.

Sunday, February 01, 2009

Hamas' Gains in the 2008 War with Israel

Enemies of the United States will never have as generous a gift as George W. Bush again. If it wasn't for the innocent people who would die, I would wish Bush could run again, and I'd campaign for his brother to eventually run, just in hopes that that guy could be as damaging to US interests as Bush II was.

Israel also has surprisingly poor leadership for a country as prominent as it is. One would expect a tiny country, that chooses its leadership from its population of 6 million or so Jews to fail to consistently find and promote leaders of the talent of Putin, Erdogan or Jintao, who were the winners of much larger political competitions, but Israel needs leaders of that caliber, especially if it cannot be carried by the United States.

But this last war was very bad for Israel for two different reasons. 1- Israel's inability to capture and hold contested land has been reaffirmed and 2 - Israel's moral image has tarnished to a degree far greater than Hamas could have hoped for.

First, there can be no argument that Hamas believes it gained more than it lost because it continues to fire rockets into Israel - in effect daring Israel, right now, to do it again. I find this a stunning development. Possibly Israel's leaders have learned that they did not gain from the previous attack - or more interestingly, possibly the Obama administration is refusing to give promise the amount of support Bush offered. One way or another, Israel seems reluctant to begin another 20 day bombing and invasion campaign. These, I believe, are the reasons why:

Israel's Inability to Hold Enemy Land

2006 proved that Israel is not able to hold Hezbollah territory. But Hamas is far more poorly equipped, manned and dug in than Hezbollah. Hamas never attacked IDF forces, but at least could claim that it was waiting to see how far Israel advanced, attacking on the most favorable terms it could get once the full extent of the invasion was in view. Would Hamas have been able to inflict the damage Hezbollah inflicted? A 1 to 1 fatality rate for soldiers? Of course not, but how much worse would it have done? Israel decided that we are never going to find out, and suddenly pulled completely out of Gaza before the Obama inauguration. Some people in Gaza City, Damascus and Tehran had to be asking, "are these guys serious? I thought this was an invasion." If Israel doesn't think it can hold a zone in Gaza at acceptable cost there's nobody to argue that it can. But exposing this inability with respect to Gaza, which has been under siege for two years is a very poor showing.

What this means is that even if Sadat was right that Egypt could not militarily retake the Sinai, it is possible now for Israel's neighbors to hold territory without Israeli or American cooperation. Will Egypt tomorrow go to Iran and ask for help fortifying its border with Israel to make its territory impervious to Israeli invasion? No. But the option is there now, and will be there from now of for future Egyptian leaderships as they decide what stance to take with respect to Israel.

This is similar to the result of the 2006 Lebanon war. Israel intervened in Jordan to protect a friendly government in the 1970s. But was unwilling or unable to do the same to prevent Hezbollah's demonstrations in Beirut which led to Hezbollah's entrance into Lebanon's government. Israel now is shown unable to even intervene militarily to protect a friendly government in Gaza. The strategic calculus of the region will now take this into account. Israel can bomb civilians, at a high moral cost, but other than that does not have a military option any more. This is a major development.

Going off track for a moment, during the Lebanon demonstrations, Nasrallah said of Saniora:
"If we wanted to stage a coup, you would have woken up this morning in prison, or in the middle of the sea."
Saniora, overseas at the time, got the fairly elegantly delivered threat and told his Western handlers while in Qatar that he is not going back to Lebanon unless Hezbollah is satisfied with an agreement. The point is that Israel just had to watch. Its only option would have been to bomb some power plants or nurseries which leads to the second issue.

The Tarnish in the West of Israel's Moral Position

Israel has never come under moral attack in the West as it did earlier this year. During the 2006 war, it was widely accepted as a position in the West that while opposition to specific actions of the Israeli government are acceptable, opposition to the existence of a Jewish state is inherently anti-Semitic and therefore immoral. While not unanimous, this was the consensus view of the United States educated class, among those interested enough to have formed an opinion.

The acceptance of the position that it is anti-Semitic to oppose a Jewish state was eroding before Israel's bombing began, but it died sometime during the campaign.

On January 8, Time magazine ran a pretty standard article expressing the difficulty of Israel remaining a Jewish state over the long term.

But by January 21, the New York Times ran an article by Muammar Qaddafi advocating a one-state solution where Jews would not have a majority. This has been Qaddafi's preferred solution for a long time, as well as Tehran's, but I had never seen it presented, by an advocate, in a major US media outlet.

Advocates for Zionism routinely describe this goal of most of the supposedly radical parties in the Middle East as the "destruction of Israel." Until this war, advocates of this goal have never been able to present their view to casual US readers.

Then by January 25, CBS News presented a one state non-Jewish situation as Israel's only alternative to ethnic cleansing or apartheid.
Demographers predict that within ten years Arabs will outnumber Jews in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Without a separate Palestinian state the Israelis would have three options, none of them good. They could try ethnic cleansing, drive the Palestinians out of the West Bank, or they could give the Palestinians the vote. That would be the democratic option but it would mean the end of the Jewish state. Or they could try apartheid - have the minority Israelis rule the majority Palestinians, but apartheid regimes don't have a very long life.
The United States still supports Israel, though the Democratic party has begun to diverge from the Republican party on this issue. But bombing civilians, which is the last remaining capability of the IDF, is reaching the point where it damages Israel's prospects more than it helps, even looking only at the United States, to say nothing of, for example, Turkey.

Hamas is now acting as if it has nothing to fear from another Israeli bombing campaign. The December 2008 campaign may be the event that made Hamas right.

Turkey and Israel Seriously Parting Ways?

Turkey's rift with Israel seems to be more significant than it first appears.

First, when I'm wrong about the Middle East, it is usually that pro-US dictatorships or actors are more loyal to their patrons and/or more effective than I expected. Sometimes I'm right, for example I was sure Saniora couldn't prevail over Hezbollah in Lebanon. But sometimes I'm wrong. For example, I had no idea Egypt would go along with Western hostility to Hamas to the degree that it has.

Turkey is a democracy with a pro-Western military sector that is to some degree shielded from democratic pressure. If I'm wrong, it will be because this sector asserts itself in Israel's favor in a way that I can't foresee now.

More background, I am a big fan of Erdogan, and have been since I first noticed him on the scene of Turkish politics. His success in Turkish politics against the political forces that have been arrayed before him demonstrate extraordinary political skill. In terms of political skill - by which I mean the ability to use a competitive political system to position oneself to move a country in the direction one favors - I'd guess that Erdogan is one of the five most effective politicians in the world today.

My first impulse regarding the blowup at Davos was that this is just personal theatrics. The type of thing that ebbs and flows in interstate relations, but does not have any long term impact. It was somewhat entertaining. I was personally struck by Erdogan's claim that he complained to Olmert about Israel's imprisonment of Palestinian parliamentarians and Olmert said that to release the elected members of parliament would cause problems for Abbas. I guess everyone knows this, but for Erdogan to say it in public would have been painful for Abbas' supporters. Israel's direct interference in Palestinian politics against the expressed will of Palestinian voters and in support of Abbas is so openly known that it is not even notable that the Prime Minister of Turkey describes an instance of it, confidentially related by Israel's prime minister, at the World Economic Forum.
And I said to Prime Minister Olmert that they held the Ministers and Members of Parliament of Palestine. I suggested also, that there could perhaps be a gesture made, similar to the gesture made to President Abbas before, they could be released perhaps. But Prime Minister Olmert said that this would make things very difficult for President Abbas.
Afterwards, Israel has not been acting like this is an isolated episode of hurt personal feelings on the part of Erdogan, and neither has Turkey. First Turkey claimed that Peres apologized to Erdogan, which Israel denied. So Turkey released what it claims is a transcript of the telephone conversation. (!?)
Peres: Such things happen between friends. I am very sorry for today's incident. Firstly, my respect towards the Turkish republic and you a prime minister has never changed.
In Erdogan's Newsweek interview the next day, the interviewer pressed Erdogan on a sense of disfavor for Turkey that apparently is being felt in the US Jewish community. This recent increase in disfavor had until now been outside of my field of observation.
[Erdogan] There are those who try to claim that my attitude towards Israel's latest attacks on Gaza is because I'm anti-Semitic or against the Jewish people.
[Newsweek] And some American Jews are very upset about it.
[Erdogan] And I'm very upset at them. Beginning with the Jews who live in my country, they are witnesses to my attitude towards Jews. As an individual, I have always declared that anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity. As a prime minister I have always been against anti-Semitism and my frustration is against the current Israeli government because they did not act fairly towards us.
Then Israel's foreign minister, instead of attempting to move past this incident, ties it to Turkey's willingness to meet with Hamas years ago.
"It must be remembered that after Hamas took power, Turkey was the first country to invite them over, so we find ourselves both in an important relationship but also in a dispute about how to conduct ourselves regionally," Livni told Israel Radio.
Peres and Livni both compare Erdogan unfavorably to Mubarak and Abbas. This is a mind-boggling example of a lack of self-consciousness. Does it even need to be said that unlike Mubarak or Abbas, Erdogan can actually win an election without imprisoning his opponents? Israel has stooges in the region, and manages these stooges sometimes more effectively than I give Israel credit for. But has it reached the point that Israel's leaders no longer even realize that Abbas, Mubarak and the Abdullahs are stooges?

Back to Turkey. My take now is that, in the background, Turkey has been a more insistent advocate for Hamas being allowed to take power than has been widely expressed. It also has not cooperated sufficiently, by Israel's standards, in Israel's project to isolate Iran. I can't see any other fundamental basis for dispute that has existed between Israel and Turkey over the past few years. Turkish Iran and Palestine policy has genuinely been less pro-Israel than at least the Israelis would like and this has reached a point that Israelis are now openly discussing the breach, and beginning to threaten that there can be consequences for the breach.

The difference between Israel and Turkey, in terms of the United States, is that Israel is a strategic liability for the United States that the United States tolerates because of a sentimental feeling of kinship that many Jewish and non-Jewish Americans feel with Israelis. Turkey's relationship is a legitimate strategic asset for the United States. If the two come into direct contradiction, Turkey is essentially guaranteed to win - or if Turkey loses, Russia and anti-US segments of Europe win.

On example of a direct confrontation between Israel's interests and Turkey's is Kurdistan. Israel's advocates have for years advocated the atomization of Arab states, because smaller pieces of disintegrated states are weaker and easier to set against one another than unified states. For the same reason, I always (I cannot think of an exception) oppose separatist movements in the global South.
Furthermore, as far back as 1982 the Israeli newspaper Haaretz's legendary military correspondent Ze'ev Schiff (recently deceased) had written that Israel's "best" interests would be served by "the dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite state, a Sunni state and the separation of the Kurdish part,"
An atomized Iraq means Kurds are in a better position to pressure Turkey, and if Kurdish dreams come true, even to atomize Turkey itself, creating a Kurdish homeland on soil now under Turkish control.

I worried that the United States was effectively assisting Kurdish moves towards independence. George W. Bush was just stupid enough, just a poor enough politician that it seemed as if the US would, in practical terms if not openly, work in Israel's interests and against Turkey's for a decentralized Iraq. This would, of course, lead to a Turkish anti-US reaction that would only escalate over time.

There never was a big announcement, but somehow the Kirkuk referendum has been forgotten and the US has backtracked on its decentralized Iraq policy. This was pretty close to a direct Turkey vs Israel fight over US policy and while the US legislature spoke as if it favored decentralization, somehow the US professional military and strategic policy class overruled the advocates of decentralization.

Turkey is not like Israel. The US does not support Turkey because it likes Turks. Turkey is essential for US and US-friendly forces, instead of Russian forces, to maintain long-term control over the Mediterranean.

US support for Israel has limits. The US is willing to send guns, bombs and money and willing to be unpopular while vetoing UN resolutions for Israel. But the US is not going to risk Turkey becoming anti-American for Israel. This should have been clear almost from the day of the invasion of Iraq. It is a testament to the incompetence of George W. Bush that a US policy against partition took until late last year to form and be implemented. Obama is not nearly as poor a leader.

Parenthetically, the same military and strategic professionals who eventually vetoed US support for Iraqi partition are also preventing, for US military and strategic reasons, either a US or Israeli direct strike against Iran.

But back to Turkey. Turkey has a pro-Israel military segment that is to some degree protected from the democratic process in the country. Erdogan, it now seems, has been removing this insulation with the end result possibly being a Turkey that looks, to Israel, more like Iran and Syria than Egypt and Jordan. If he is not, Israel at least seems to think he is.

If a hostile Turkey is a smaller threat to Israel than Iran breaking out of its Western isolation, it is only so by a very small amount. A hostile Turkey and a hostile Iran together would probably make the cost of supporting Israel unbearable for the US.

We aren't there yet. Israel's leaders though don't seem to be acting as if Turkey is a very important ally for them that, at least long term, Israel cannot afford to lose. The converse is just not the case. If Israel had a political leader as skilled as Erdogan, that person would realize this immediately.

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

2009 Predictions

Egypt: Is this the year Mubarak steps off the scene? It doesn't matter much. Egypt will not end up with leadership that is unacceptable to either the United States or Israel. One of these years will be the year. It could be this year, but it could be four years from now. Egypt will continue its hostility towards Hamas/Gaza - not because of Egyptian considerations but because Mubarak's family pockets part of the US Camp David payments. It's that simple and that disgusting but it is an arrangement that will be stable for the next year.

Gaza: Right now a lot of things are in flux in Gaza. My best prediction is that next year Hamas will still run Gaza. We'll see about the crossings but if there is a blockade there will be some form of resistance. I can't predict at this point what form it will take, but rockets like now are a good bet along with increased hostility against Fatah in the West Bank.

Israel: Netanyahu is ahead in the polls right now. Hillary was ahead in the polls last year at this time. Olmert/Kadima may just hang on. I'll predict a right coalition though. The stooges - Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia - will complain about Israel's rightward swing, but I'm no longer able to say their policies will reflect their complaints in any tangible way.

West Bank: The US is feverishly working to keep Abbas in power and protected from Palestine's voters. The US opposition to democracy in the Middle East - which follows necessarily from its support for Israel - is the US' most egregious departure from its founding ideals. Unfortunately, I predict that Abbas will still be in power, propped by US resources, this time next year.

Lebanon: I'm going to predict a slow year. Hezbollah will do well in the elections. Bush would react with a Gaza-type collective punishment on the Lebanese for voting wrong. I don't see Obama doing that, but Obama really is a wild card right now.

Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia: Slow year

Iraq: The US has no intention of fully withdrawing, but can't stay without Iraqi and Iranian cooperation. This will not be easy to solve but I expect that by this time next year there will be open discussions about a long-term US presence in Iraq - which means that Iran will have to have been bought off. It is clearer than ever that the Kurds can expect no further US help in their hopes for independence.

Iran: Iran will certainly be enriching uranium this time next year. Possibly, if there is a deal, it will be enriching at a slower pace than now, along with a relaxation of some sanctions and a torrent of complaints from Israel and Israel's supporters in the US.

Pakistan: Impossible to guess where things will be there. Hopefully there will not be much life-costing chaos in that country.

Afghanistan: Obama is planning on bringing more troops to Afghanistan, as if he thinks he can defeat the Taliban, which he clearly cannot. Like the surge of troops into Iraq, this looks like an honorable way for the US to pay the Taliban to join the government - which can work. As with Iraq, it also would work without the extra troops, but the US likes to pretend it is defeating people for some reason. Fine, it's the US' money at stake here.

Lots of 2008 Predictions

This prediction thing is not that easy. But there is a lot to learn by giving it a try. I made a decent amount of predictions about now last year around this time, so I guess I now have to pay the piper. Let's see how these went:

The United States is going to expend a lot of resources this year keeping both Olmert and Abbas in power. Once one is gone though, it can let go of the other. I'm confident that in two years, both Israel and Palestine will be represented by more radical leaderships. One year is harder to predict. I'm leaning towards either more radical elements of Fatah or Hamas being in power in the West Bank and Israel's right wing replacing Olmert by this time next year.


The resources thing was more an observation than a prediction. Olmert and Abbas both lasted the year though. I leaned against that because it seemed a year was plenty of time for Israel's right wing to organize itself for a challenge that it would win. It seemed like a close call at the time, but I fell on the wrong side. I said at the time that I was confident both would be gone by this time in 2010. I'll look back at that in my post for 2009 predictions. I'm less confident of that prediction now though.

It is easy to predict that the United States will continue its policy of refusing to engage Hamas until Hamas renounces the right to return. And Hamas will not renounce the right of return. Forgetting morality, this is the most impractical possible policy for the US to take and it will take a toll on US relationships with other powers in the region while pointlessly leading to Palestinian and Israeli deaths that otherwise would not have occurred. US Gaza policy bears the mark of an exceptionally untalented administration in the US executive branch.

Next year at this time, Hamas will be in power at least in Gaza. One way or another goods will easily reach Gaza through Egypt. The weaponry and skill of anti-Israel forces in Gaza will increase substantially. It is possible but not quite probable that over this year rockets from Gaza actually are going to become routinely fatal to Israelis. I hope though that in two years, after a year without Bush and Rice, a long term cease-fire is reached that stops the rockets and ends the siege. This siege is comically stupid. It accomplishes nothing. It has to be the stupidest siege in history.


Hamas is still in power. Goods do not easily reach Gaza through Egypt though. Egypt has proven more hostile to the Palestinians than I would have guessed last year. And by Egypt I mean Mubarak. If there is a pattern in my mispredicting the Middle East, it is that I am overoptimistic that the pro-Israel/US dictators will start acting more independent. These guys are well under US/Israeli control, as much I as wish and even predict otherwise.

It is easy to predict that the United States will continue to insist that Lebanon's Shiites will not have proportionate power in Lebanon's government and that Lebanon's Shiites will not end the current stalemate as long as US allies in Lebanon reflect this position. This policy will pointlessly lead to Lebanese deaths that otherwise would not have occurred. In the end, the Shiites will have a veto just as smaller population groups do. This must be the stupidest political stalemate in the world today.

Next year at this time there will be a government in place in Lebanon. Hezbollah will not be disarmed and may be in the process of folding into the Lebanese army. Effectively, the Shiites will have veto power and there will be reforms to the electoral system. Nasrallah will describe it as a victory. I'll probably agree. In other words, the stalemate will have been broken in Hezbollah's favor.


This was almost too easy.

I expect a pretty uneventful year in Syria.


I'm going to take credit for this.

Hopefully Kirkuk will not be part of Kurdistan this time next year. I'm optimistic that it will not. Most likely the postponements of the referendum in Kirkuk will be so routine that everybody knows the referendum is never going to happen.

2008 looks to be a good year in terms of not many US soldiers killed in Iraq.


Now I owe a commenter a post about Kirkuk and the Kurds in general. Essentially, in the global south I oppose separation movements. Later.

I'm going to take credit for the Kirkuk prediction. The low levels of US fatalities in Iraq was easy since the numbers were way down by the time I made the prediction.

I for a moment thought that if it looked like it would help Obama, and Iran thought Obama would be better, Iran might turn the heat up and raise US casualty levels in Iraq. That's really not Iran's style though and Obama by the summer didn't seem that much better than McCain. McCain would not bomb Iran any faster than Obama or Clinton. If the US military thought Iran could be bombed, Bush certainly, certainly would have ordered it.

Iran has informed the IAEA that it is testing a new centrifuge design. At this time next year there will be at least some operational. What Iran has now is really enough though, so getting a few hundred of another design running doesn't change the strategic picture at all. Of course neither the US or Israel are going to bomb Iran in 2008.


I don't think Iran has uranium running through its IR2s yet. So that may be wrong, or it may not yet be reported. The bombing thing was easy but there were some who thought a bombing was plausible.

**

So I haven't tallied up a score. I think I did pretty well though actually. A lot of the predictions were easy but once they are committed to the internet there is always the chance they can be proven wrong.

Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia really want to be under the US umbrella though at least for now. Elections in any of those countries would change that, but as much as it hurts me to write this, I don't think that will change in any of those countries without a regime change.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have successions coming up. When their next leaders take over I'll get a feel for them, for now it is safe to project that they will be as reliably controlled by the US and Israel as the current leaders.

A New Day?

I don't know if I was worried about jinxing the Obama campaign somehow or if I for a period just lost the motivation to blog, but it's been almost a year since I've been here.

At the time of my last post I really didn't think Barack had a chance to win. His pledge, or at least stated plan to hold a conference of Middle Eastern parties, even enemies of the US, to discuss ways to counter terrorism struck me as enough to disqualify a candidate from a major national office in the United States.

Obama's statements since then present him as much more favorable to Israel than he appeared at the time, but he has not explicitly gone back on his earlier statements. We are going to have to learn who the real Barack Obama is over the next few months. His nominations show him as in line with previous US Middle East policy. But he insists that he, not his appointees will make policy - which just may be the case.

No verdict is in. I'm not optimistic but I am prepared to be pleasantly surprised at the degree to which Obama is able to break from the US' previous Middle East orientation. The reason is that Obama's goals in Iraq and Afghanistan would be a lot easier to reach if he can convince the region that he has or is willing to change policies on Israel and Israel-related issues such as Iranian uranium enrichment.

There's not much more to say except we shall see.