Sharif to Participate In Pakistan Election

Terrible news for Pakistan. But this is the result Musharraf flew to Saudi Arabia to bring about. The biggest villain in the story here is Musharraf. Sharif and Bhutto are each in a position that while both together could weaken Musharraf, maybe fatally, neither can alone. Sharif says he tried to convince Bhutto do join a boycott. Bhutto has not denied it to my knowledge. Here is a report.

The party of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced Sunday that it would participate in Pakistan's parliamentary elections next month after failing to convince rival Benazir Bhutto to join a boycott.

Greater participation will make the balloting look more open, bolstering President Pervez Musharraf's democratic credentials, which took a hit over his Nov. 3 declaration of a state of emergency and his dismissal of independent-minded judges.

Without assurances that a boycott would not happen, Musharraf would not have brought Sharif back. So he had to be confident that at least one would participate. Maybe that confidence came from Bhutto, maybe it came from a commitment from Sharif that he would end up participating at the last minute.

There will be later fights though. In the meantime it is important for everyone involved who understands to say publicly that there is nothing worse a country's leadership can do to the country than fail to follow pre-determined rules for the succession of power.

Jonathan Schell's Long View on Nuclear Disarmament

A very interesting interview at Tom Dispatch with Jonathan Schell, an expert on the issue of nuclear proliferation and disarmament.

TD: Let's move back, for a moment, to the immediate crisis. Let's talk about the Iranian nuclear situation. What do you make of it?

Schell: ... Iran is de facto heading down a path that leads towards the bomb. Whether they actually want to turn themselves into a nuclear power or, like India for many decades or Japan today, simply be ready to do so in a couple of months, I don't know. But they're enriching uranium. ...

... It appears that Iran is determined to have that technology and keep it, not roll it back. So you are left with the only other option within this framework -- the use of military force. I would say, though, that the surefire way of ensuring that Iran will go for the bomb is to attack them. ...

... The option which is never explored, although I'm convinced it's the key to breaking an impasse like this one, is for the nuclear powers to bring their own weapons to the negotiating table and say: We will reduce ours -- eventually down to zero -- on condition that you proliferators stop proliferating.

... ... ...

Now, imagine a situation in which these powers [Russia, China and the Nuclear Powers of the UN Security Council] have decided they are ready to surrender their own nuclear arsenals and rely on an abolition agreement in the same way they now rely on those arsenals for their security. There would be no disunity among them in approaching Iran. ... You would have a united global will which, in my opinion, would simply be irresistible to any country -- whether Iran, North Korea, or Israel -- that proposed to hold on to its own little arsenal in defiance of the united resolve of the Earth.

... ... ...

TD: Even if you were going to build down your nuclear arsenals over a long period…?

Schell: Even then. You could simply start off with a freeze everywhere. ... Russia and the United States would initially agree to go down to 500 weapons from their present combined 25,000 or so weapons. In exchange for that, Iran would stop its enrichment activities, or begin to dismantle its enrichment facilities. ...

Schell takes a fundamental long view, that the human race, once it began science was eventually going to find nuclear power and develop the ability to destroy the human race itself. And a similar long view of the future, the human race will have to come up with mechanisms to prevent its own destruction.

I agree with the fundamental view. The steps Schell proposes to reach that, that the US freeze its arsenal and in exchange everyone else freezes without nuclear weapons for the duration of some form of negotiations, would not work.

Few people understand that the non-weapons signatories of the NPT have never agreed to be permanently bereft of nuclear weapons. Much less did they agree to never become nuclear capable. They agreed that as long as they didn't have weapons, everyone should know they don't have weapons based on inspections by a neutral party.

Eventually, possibly and hopefully in my lifetime, the nuclear powers led by the United States will make an objective commitment - one that will be difficult or impossible to get out of - to fully disarm. That is the point where a general consensus toward disarmament can form that would be impossible for small states such as Iran, India, Israel, Pakistan, etc. to resist.

Until that point is reached, proposals to freeze the nuclear status quo in place pending further steps to be taken in the indefinite future will continue to be flatly denied by the non-weapons states. With good reason.

Two difficulties - why the problem has not been solved yet - are one that the United States is so far not unhappy with the status quo and does not have motivation to commit to disarmament and two that if the United States was willing to make a commitment, it would be difficult to enforce such a commitment if the US changes its mind later.

One observation is that there is some amount of serious thought and other resources that will have to be applied to these problems before solutions are reached. Even though the solutions are not in sight, they are very likely to exist. Kind of like the solutions to the problem of how to get more transistors than we can get today onto a given area of circuitry.

Until that time though, Schell is right that nuclear weapons capability is spreading, as if by destiny, to every corner of the human race. It is a very interesting interview to read.

Israel Doesn't Want To, and Cannot Bomb Iran Alone

A recent poll says the Israeli population opposes a unilateral attack on Iran.

When asked "should Israel alone attack the Iranian nuclear installations," 67.2 percent said no, while 20.9 percent said yes and 11.9 percent had no opinion, said the survey aired on public radio.

Even if Israel's people favored an attack without American assistance, it would not be feasible.

Several of Israel's Iran experts say the American rethink on the threat posed by Iran had ruled out a US military strike and probably an Israeli strike too, at least for now. However, Israel's political hawks continue to keep the threat of action alive.

... ... ...

However, it is widely assumed Israel would need at least American approval if not cooperation for any bombing mission. In particular, Israel's air force would need the US flight codes that would allow its planes to cross safely into Iran. When Israel requested those codes in 1991, to attack Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the first Gulf War, the United States refused and there was no Israeli strike.

... ... ...

"I think it is quite unrealistic to think Israel will go it alone against Iran in a military way," said Ephraim Asculai, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He said it appeared Iran would respond to a tougher sanctions regime that demonstrated to Tehran that the cost of its nuclear ambitions outweighed their benefits.

The Israeli climbdown will be complete when the Israelis accept not only that will there not be military strikes, but there also will not be tougher sanctions. It looks like 2008 will be the year Israel and the US accept Iran as a nuclear-capable power in the same sense as Brazil.

Moscow's Never Seen Evidence of an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program

"Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program" that is a vague enough phrase that by defining and redefining the phrase itself, with no change in underlying evidence, it is possible to assert either its existence or non-existence.

The US has finessed the issue to the point now that it asserts there was a nuclear weapons program in 2003, but not now. Now the US asserts that there was not a program in 2005, but in 2005 by which time essentially all of the activities and and all of the facilities that are now known were known already, it asserted, using the 2005 definition, that there was a nuclear weapons program.

Russia now, by directly contradicting the US claim that there was a nuclear weapons program in 2003 challenges the US to put forward one definition that it will stand by of what constitutes a nuclear weapons program. The US will not take up that challenge, and future efforts to isolate Iran will suffer because of that.

Anyway, from AP:

"It fully confirms the information that we have: that there is no military element in their nuclear program. We hope very much that these negotiations with Iran will continue," he told reporters after meeting with Rice on the sidelines of a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels

... ... ...

But Lavrov on Wednesday said Moscow had not seen any evidence that Iran had, in fact, ever had a nuclear weapons program, not even one that it had given up on four years ago. He also criticized the United States for its missile defense plans.

In exchange for doing what it can to calm Iraq long enough for the Iraqis to ask the US to leave, Iran has not only stalled the sanctions drive over the same time period, but it is unlikely that the sanctions drive will ever again reach the intensity it had on December 2, 2007. The only remaining question is how long will it take, and what will be the fallout from the US accepting Iran as a nuclear capable state.

Long Term Troops in Iraq

My guess at this point is that the US has gotten Maliki to agree to extend the UN mandate for US troops until the end of 2008, after the next US Presidential Election. If the Iraqis and US come to an agreement about long term relationships, which I do not expect, then that agreement still will not pass Parliament in Iraq.

After November, everyone including the Iraqis will have a new US executive branch to negotiate with, that will have more flexibility than the present one - for domestic political reasons, Bush refuses do anything that could be interpreted as an admission of defeat.

My guess is that the next administration will commit the US to a full phase out of US troops from Iraq. That is what the Iraqis will demand.

Another guess (which I make in agreement with commenter Ziad) is that putting an objective brake on US sanctions efforts was traded with Iran for doing everything it can to keep Iraq calm until 2008/2009. If that was the deal Iran probably got slightly better terms. Iran doesn't necessarily want to kill American troops if the US is leaving anyway, and the US has to leave anyway. The US does want as many sanctions as it can get and will probably get fewer sanctions than it could have gotten otherwise, if the US had been willing to sacrifice US soldiers for those sanctions.

I strongly doubt (in disagreement with Stratfor, same link) that Iran has agreed to a long term US presence in Iraq. Stratfor consistently says Iran is on the verge of agreeing to a long term US presence in Iraq. It seems more like wishful thinking on the part of the US foreign policy community that Stratfor is plugged into than a reflection of the views Iran consistently expresses in every possible venue.

Kommersant on the 2007 Iran NIE

The dust has not settled yet on the newest report. Kommersant, a Russian news source reports that the report was the result of allies of George H.W. Bush outmaneuvering US hard-liners on the Iran case.

Kommersant has learnt from its sources in Washington that the US intelligence report which repudiated the White House's position on the Iranian problem was the result of a struggle between factions in the Bush administration. According to our sources, the report was essentially inspired by former President George Bush Sr, who was keen to outplay Vice-President Richard Cheney's faction and protect his son from fresh failures. However, there has been no softening in the US position on the Iranian problem. Yesterday the White House confirmed that a draft document on fresh sanctions against Iran would be tabled at the UN Security Council in the very near future... It's worth noting that the UN Security Council's working schedule for the rest of the year, which was released on Tuesday, includes the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, focusing on the "Iranian nuclear file". However, at the same time there is no specific date in the Security Council's work plan for consideration of the Iranian issue. That means that any member of the UN Security Council could initiate a discussion at any moment, presenting its partners in the Security Council with the necessity of making a final choice.

Tabling a draft means nothing. Getting new sanctions passed will be much more difficult, and the Bush administration when it released this report knew it would make getting new sanctions or tightening sanctions in place more difficult. It is most likely that the Iran issue will go into a holding pattern until the end of the Bush administration.

The US has not officially accepted Iranian enrichment, but giving Iran at least another year to improve its enrichment techniques and leaving negotiations to Bush's successor in practical terms means the US will not be able to prevent Iran from having an enrichment program.

Settling in the Post 2007 Iran NIE World

I'll make this point again, because the only place I've seen it made is here. The new assessment that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program is not the result of new evidence. It is the result of a redefinition of the term "nuclear weapons program." That is a political decision, that cannot have been made in the United States against the will of the President of the United States.

By the 2005 definition, Iran has a nuclear weapons program today. By the 2007 definition, there was no evidence, certainly not evidence that would have given intelligence agencies high confidence that there was a nuclear weapons program in 2005.

The conversion and enrichment facilities that the IAEA knows about, and have known about since 2003, were explicitly defined in the first footnote in the 2007 report as not part of a weapons program. In the 2005 report those same facilities, at that time dormant, constituted nearly the entirety of the evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. The same facilities - a different definition.

A political decision has been made to back away from the idea that the capacity to build a weapon by itself is a weapons program. It was always an unreasonable idea and now that the US has backed from it, that idea will never have currency again.

To the degree there is intelligence available in 2007 that was not available in 2005, the most important piece of information is neither some phone call or exile from Iran. The important piece of information was that Iran was not going to suspend enrichment under any amount of pressure the US could apply before the end of this term.

Colin Powell recognized the probability that Iran would not be motivated by the type of sanctions the US could get when he was still in term. The rest of the White House probably knew it also, but thought, why not take a shot? Especially since in the process the US could get sanctions that the US wanted anyway.

But now as Bush's term is ending, US rhetoric that the alternative to in Iranian back-down was an attack was scaring US allies and parties whose cooperation the US wants more than it was scaring Iran. Now that it is clear that Iran will not back down, the rhetoric had to change. And change it has.

So in that context the Christian Science monitor proposes that the US accept a deal Iran offered in 2005.

This leaves Tehran's nuclear tethering proposal. Fleshed out, the "international joint ownership" and "international partnerships" Tehran advocated would include co-decisionmaking and facility access that assures Iran's nuclear fuel cycle remains on the straight and narrow to avoid a weapons breakout.

A new door would open to resolve the enrichment impasse if two things happened. First, tethering must be linked to Iran's promised ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol, allowing inspectors unimpeded visits to all suspicious nuclear enterprises. Second, it must be tied further to Security Council adoption of automatic onerous punitive measures to combat cheating – a military blockade of the country, for example.

Now Iran will agree to joint ownership of enrichment facilities in Iran. Iran will not agree to automatic military blockades. It is hard to justify an automatic military blockade if Iran exercises its perfectly legal right to leave the NPT if the US is not willing to blockade Israel for refusing to join the NPT.

Iran would not leave the NPT except under circumstances where it would have at least some international support for leaving. Iran might leave if the US began massing troops for an invasion, or if Israel uses nuclear weapons on Syria or Egypt. Under those circumstances, the US would not be able to get a Security Council resolution.

If there is no circumstance that would give Iran a chance of preventing security council action against its leaving the treaty, Iran would have no reason to leave anyway. Iran gets all it wants just by being nuclear capable. Until a provocative step is taken either by the US or by Israel.

The automatic part, or language that could imaginably justify the US unilaterally applying military force to Iran would not get past the security council anyway. If it did, the US would claim it has been triggered when it really hasn't, if and when the US is in a position to attack Iran. After Iraq, the Security Council will never come that close again to pre-authorizing a US military adventure.

Annotated Snips from the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate

Here are some segments from the National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007 - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

This Estimate does assume that the strategic goals and basic structure of Iran’s senior leadership and government will remain similar to those that have endured since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. We acknowledge the potential for these to change during the time frame of the Estimate, but are unable to confidently predict such changes or their implications. This Estimate does not assess how Iran may conduct future negotiations with the West on the nuclear issue.

Regime change is not discussed in the report except indirectly here, where for the purposes of this report, it is assumed that the current regime or one like it will remain in power for the ten year term being projected. The consensus from what I'm reading is that the US foreign policy community is not confident in the chances of a pro-US regime change. I'd say there is good reason for that.

1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.

The fireworks start with the first footnote. This is the departure not only from previous NIEs concerning Iran, but from the entirety of previous US policy. The idea that Iran's civil work related to conversion and enrichment is not part of a "nuclear weapons program" is contrary to every public statement the US has made on this issue until this point.

D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example, Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

Again, this seems like an intelligence report from some country other than the United States. The same information in 2005, or earlier this year if spoken about by any member of the Administration instead of "limited use", would be described as useful only for weapons.

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

Pressure on Iran to continue what it is doing now - which according to new US policy, is a "current halt to its weapons program" - should be the object of diplomatic policies of pressure. There is no call for pressure on Iran to reverse its current policy and stop enrichment. The producers of this report seem comfortable with Iranian civil enrichment.

We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.

This is the part that says an attack would not work to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. That an attack would not work is clearly the conventional Washington wisdom at this point. The overarching point of the NIE, it seems, is that threats to attack also do not work. Another point seems to be that the policy of attempting to force Iran to abandon fuel cycle technologies also will not work.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

Iran is, in the long term, nuclear capable. This is a substantial step-down from the US position this summer. Obviously something has been churning in the background. It is not clear what it means. We'll learn more from future statements.

***

I note that this report is a repudiation of Israel's policy that no other Middle East country can be nuclear capable. US and Israel's policy on that matter are no longer aligned because while preventing Iran from being nuclear capable is important for Israel, the US is accepting that it just does not have the resources to prevent nuclear capability from spreading.

It is possible that this report does not reflect solidly held views in the White House, that this report is a feeler but not a commitment to accept Iran's nuclear program basically as it is now. But the willingness to publish views so far at odds with previous policy is in itself a departure from previous policy.

I think it is possible, but much less likely, that this is the result of a mutiny in the White House, with George Bush somehow unwillingly maneuvered into a position where he had to allow a report to be published that implies policy positions contrary to those he holds.

If neither of the two above situations is in place, then this report marks at least the potential for a major transformation of US policy towards Iran.

US Separates Enrichment From Weapons

The most important specific change made in the 2007 NIE is that civilian enrichment, which can lead to the development of a nuclear weapons capability, is separate from a nuclear weapons program. Of course capability and weapons are different in real life, but the US foreign policy community, along with US allies and press advocates who follow the US line, has been blurring the distinction consistently until this dramatic reversal.

The new recognition of the difference between capability and weapons is not the result of new information. The 2005 report does not directly contradict the 2007 report. The projected time period where Iran will be able to produce weapons grade uranium has not changed at all. The difference is that the 2005 report describes Iranian efforts to develop uranium conversion and enrichment technologies as part of a weapons program - despite Iranian offers to conduct those activities under IAEA supervision. The 2007 report describes the same activities as separate from a weapons program.

The difference between the 2005 and 2007 reports is purely a political decision the describe the same activities using different language. This political decision has been approved by the White House and any objections by supposed hawks have been overcome.

This clears the way now for US policy to take the distinction into account and accept an arrangement in which Iran retains civilian fuel cycle technologies. It seems now that George W. Bush's "World War III" language if Iran gets the knowledge necessary to build nuclear weapons was a last gasp of a policy that was on the way out at the time the statement was made. That policy has now been publicly overturned.

I lean towards the idea that this change in public position is made with the expectation of, at some point, a concession from Iran. I'm not sure what concession the US expects and what parties in Iran are willing to deliver the concession.

Stratfor Thinks a Deal Has Been Reached Between US and Iran

Interesting theory: (Free link through Google News)

As to the U.S. motive, it also wanted to play up the nuclear threat. Part of Washington's negotiation strategy has been to isolate Iran from the rest of the international community. Charges that Iran desired nukes were an excellent way to marshal international action. Both sides had a vested interest in making Iran look the part of the wolf.

That no longer is the case. There are only two reasons the U.S. government would choose to issue a report that publicly undermines the past four years of its foreign policy: a deal has been struck, or one is close enough that an international diplomatic coalition is no longer perceived as critical. This level of coordination across all branches of U.S. intelligence could not happen without the knowledge and approval of the CIA director, the secretaries of defense and state, the national security adviser and the president himself. This is not a power play; this is the real deal.

The US government, the executive branch of the government, did choose to release this report. Kevin Drum's theory that congress forced it seems a lot less likely.

All I've got is speculation on the second question, but here it is: it was congressional pressure. Democratic members of the various intelligence committees saw the NIE (or a summary or a verbal report or something) and went ballistic. Footnotes and dissents are one thing, but withholding a report whose primary conclusion is 180 degrees contrary to years of administration innuendo produced a rebellion. Somebody who got briefed must have threatened something pretty serious if the NIE didn't see the light of day.

I am of the opinion that the report marks a change in policy. It is very difficult to see what the outlines of a deal could be. The United States can't end the unilateral sanctions because of domestic pressures. A stable US base in Iraq is worse for Iran than what is there now. The US can slow its efforts to deny the international banking system. I don't know that Iran would trade that for a US presence in Iraq.

National Intelligence Estimate: Cooling Down Threat of War

It is not surprising to me, because since the Iraqi insurgency began, I've always thought the US was bluffing about attacking Iran, and I've always been sure Iran's leaders have thought the US was bluffing.

The release of this National Intelligence Estimate (pdf here), including the claim that Iran halted its weapons program in 2003 not only reduces the chance that the US will attack, it reduces the credibility of threats from the US that it will do so.

US intelligence agencies undercut the White House yesterday by disclosing for the first time that Iran has not been pursuing a nuclear weapons development programme for the past four years. The secret report, which was declassified yesterday and published, marked a significant shift from previous estimates. "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005," it said.

Here is one conclusion drawn in the press:

If there was ever a possibility that President George W. Bush would drop bombs on Iran, the chances have now shrunk to nearly zero.

In one of the most dramatic National Intelligence Estimates ever, the 16 agencies of the U.S. intelligence community concluded today "with high confidence" that Iran "halted its nuclear weapons" four years ago, in the fall of 2003.

The release of this document in this form reflects a decision, correctly though lately reached, that threats are not productive. They scare everyone else, to make them more anxious for a peaceful resolution even if that means giving ground to Iran, but they do not scare Iran.

It is not the case that the executive branch of the US government was forced by the facts to release this report. It is not the case that the executive branch was forced to make public the conclusions that it drew. This is a decision to give the US room to stand down and to reassure the Europeans and Arabs that they can escape this administration without an attack even if they do not try to buy the Iranians out while still allowing some enrichment.

The conclusion that in 2003 Iran decided to halt its nuclear weapons program because of the US policy of sanctions and pressure is odd. Of course, whatever basis exists for the claim that Iran had a nuclear weapons program until 2003 is classified. Which means it is protected from public scrutiny. But that seems like a nitpick in a report that in other respects is such a reversal of the foundation of US Iran policy.

Whatever Happened to The Point Of No Return?

I haven't read about "the point of no return" in the press for several months. I was just reminded of it by the greatest US diplomat of all time, John Bolton.

In Bolton’s view, fostering regime change cannot now be relied on to prevent Iran getting the bomb: “I think the Iranians know all they need to know to create a nuclear device. The only thing that stands in their way is resources and, given that oil is at $90 a barrel or more, resources are not a constraint.”

Israel was supposed to bomb Iran before it got to this point of no return, or point where the Iranians know all they need to know to create a nuclear device. Maybe it was just a bluff.

The only person I'd rather see as permanent president of the United States than George W. Bush is John Bolton. It would take Bolton 15 years to turn the United States into Uruguay.

March 14 Feels Betrayed By the US

Time magazine is increasing its stature as one of the more reliable US press sources in discussions about the Middle East. McClatchy is also good. But here Time magazine is discussing the feeling of betrayal that led the March 14 movement to accept Suleiman.

"The Syrians are very happy," says Sami Moubayed, a Syrian political analyst. "I think this is what the Syrians always wanted — Suleiman." Parliament is scheduled to reconvene on December 7 when Suleiman is expected to be elected president.

With the announcement of Suleiman's candidacy immediately following Annapolis, it was widely assumed that Syria and the U.S. had brokered a deal to fill the Lebanese presidency as a way to help ease months of tension between their respective allies in Lebanon. However, senior March 14 politicians tell TIME that the proposal to nominate Suleiman had arisen more than a week before Annapolis, several days before Syria even announced it would attend the peace conference. The anti-Syrian block had determined it was better to choose a president acceptable to the opposition than risk a prolonged constitutional vacuum and the threat of violence erupting in Lebanon between rival factions. "We're sure that Suleiman is better than the void," says an adviser to Saad Hariri, whose Future Movement is the largest component of March 14.

Just possibly, I haven't seen an announcement yet, but maybe the other issues such as disarmament of Hezbollah, electoral reform and Parliamentry elections will be resolved, essentially in Hezbollah's favor, as part of this deal.

It is unfortunate that this dispute got as far as it did. United States never was going to invade Lebanon. Short of that, even including that, there is nothing the US could have done to change the facts on the ground, which are that Hezbollah, since the 2006 war, is the most powerful political organization in Lebanon. There never was a purpose to this dispute. It was a victory of corruption over patriotism that this dispute ever occurred.

Hopefully the realization by the pro-Western camp that the United States is not a power in Lebanese politics will lead to a faster resolution of any remaining issues.

The Saudis on Hamas and Iran's GCC Invitation

I was actually surprised by the degree to which Saudi Arabia's Prince Faisal blames the West for the breakdown of Palestine's unity government rather than Hamas.

Q: What are your thoughts on the legitimacy of Hamas as a political force in Palestine?

A: In Makkah, Hamas agreed to a cease-fire that would continue as long as peace talks continued. They formed a government of national unity. Unfortunately, the international community did not respect this government, only certain segments of it.

Recognition is not a process of reward. If you are working for peace, you must deal with the elements of peace. Undoubtedly, the government of national unity created by Hamas was an essential element in the process, yet it has been left out in the hinterlands and isolated. These events have created a feeling within Hamas that there was a conspiracy against them.

It was said that the Annapolis conference was designed to give the Arabs political cover to work against Iran. That never made sense because dictatorships don't really need political cover. If they did, they'd sound a lot more like Ahmadinejad or Rafsanjani - which is what their populations would prefer. But if there is political cover to be given out, maybe some went the other direction, allowing the GCC to invite Iran, for the first time, to its annual summit.

DUBAI: Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will attend the annual summit of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the first time, which opens in Doha on Monday. Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad-Ali Hosseini told Iranian news agency that Ahmadinejad's presence in the meeting would be an important event and added that presence of Ahmadinejad "can help boost cooperation between Iran and the Gulf Arab states" and help promote mutual understanding.

Oh, and the deadlines the Saudis believed the US would impose on Israel. Israel thinks otherwise. Israel probably has a more accurate read on US intentions than the Saudis. Any bright child would probably have a more accurate read on the US than the Saudis.

"An effort will be made to hold accelerated negotiations in the hope that it will be possible to conclude them in 2008," Olmert said, according to a statement. "

However, there is no commitment to a specific timetable regarding these negotiations."

Again, Shiite vs Sunni is Not Important

There are various reasons Western commentators insist on the story that there is a serious rivalry between Shiites and Sunnis that motivates the actions of Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis and other relatively pro-US countries in the region.

One reason is that there is an iota of truth. There is just enough truth that a person who wants to believe it for another reason could not easily be convinced otherwise. In Iraq, today, there is and has been ethnic cleansing on sectarian lines. This is not a permanent feature of Muslim history. It was not the case before the US invasion in 2003.

Doubters of the story of eternal emnity between Shiites and Sunnis point to the intermarriages in Iraq and give anecdotes of how unimportant it was in that country in mixed areas before the invasion. Iran and Saudi Arabia both define themselves as "Islamic" nations, not Sunni or Shiite nations. But the recent flare-ups in Iraq, which are real, are the backbone of the story.

The importance of the rivalry is exaggerated when this historically unusual phenomenon of personal emnity between the sects in Iraq is extended to explain policies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. But because of the situation in Iraq, clearly made worse by the US invasion, it is not possible to say there is no rivalry anywhere.

The two more important reasons the story is widely believed are wishful thinking and a desire to minimize the impact of Israel on US' strategic situation in the Middle East. Wishful thinking in that commentators have gone so far as to claim that Saudi Arabia has given Israel a status as honorary Sunnis in their fight against Iran. The Saudis believing that Israel is their ally would be great for Israel, great for the US in its role as protector of Israel but there is no question that Saudi Arabia has far warmer ties with Iran than with Israel. One country does not have relations and will not shake hands, the other made a state visit recently.

I'm sometimes puzzled by the strength of the drive western commentators have to downplay the importance of Israel as a motivating factor in the actions of Arabs and Muslims in the region. Essentially the entire political spectrum everywhere in the Middle East believes that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return is more legitmate than Israel's identity as a Jewish state.

The division in the Middle East has been, essentially since Israel's inception, between states and organizations that openly express their societies' mainstream view on the conflict and those states and organizations that agree with the mainstream view, but out of deference to the West are more silent in their opposition to Israel's legitimacy. Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran are in the first camp, Egypt Jordan and Saudi Arabia are in the second.

Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are presented as Sunni countries allied against the Shiites. But if religious parties take over the first two countries or political power leaves a single family in the third, all of these countries would change sides. Not to the Shiite side, but to the side that openly expresses and acts on their belief that Israel's Jewish identity is not legitimate if it comes at the expense of the right of Palestinian refugees to return.

On issues involving Israel, public opinion polls in Sunni countries always show majorities of the populations of these Sunni countries agreeing with Iran's position on and against the side the governments of the Sunnis countries take.

But instead of relatively pro-Israel countries against relatively anti-Israel countries - which is the more accurate description of the division, western commentators paint the division as between Sunnis and Shiites, which is far more an accident of history. The Shah was an ally of the Saudis, but Iran was just as Shiite as it is today. If the Muslim Brotherhood takes power in Egypt, it will ally with Iran, while remaining just as Sunni as now.